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The idea that conscious decisions determine our actions has been challenged by a 
report which suggested that the brain starts preparing for a movement before the 
conscious decision to move (Libet et al., 1983). Since they found that cortical movement 
preparation started before the conscious decision to move, Libet et al. argued that 
movements are initiated unconsciously, and not as a result of our conscious decisions. In 
this thesis, we described the study on which these claims were based, summarised several 
criticisms of Li bet et al. 's conclusions, and presented four experiments addressing two 
main alternative explanations ofLibet et al. 's results. One of these was based on a 
smearing artifact that occurs during EEG averaging, and the other questioned Libet et 
al. 's assumption that the EEG present before the decision to move reflected the processes 
underlying movement initiation. 
The main aim of the first two experiments was to test an explanation ofLibet et 
al. 's results based on an artifact of EEG averaging. In these two experiments, temporal-
order judgment methodology was used to look at the distribution in time of the reported 
times of the decision to move. Specifically, we tested whether the earliest reported 
decision-time could have occurred before the onset of cortical movement preparation 
(which Libet et al. reported at 500 msec before the movement). The results of 
Experiment 2 (but not Experiment 1) suggested that the earliest decisions may have been 
reported more than 500 msec before the movement Thus (since the earliest decisions 




may have been before the start of the RP on each individual trial, despite Libet 
et al.'s averaged results. 
111 
A second possible explanation for Libet et al. 's results was based on a review of 
different measures of cortical movement preparation (summarised in Chapter 3), which 
suggested that the Readiness Potential (the RP, which Libet et al. used to measure 
movement preparation) may not be specific to movement initiation, but may instead 
reflect a number of processes associated with the anticipation of a future movement. We 
also argued that the Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP), which measures hand-specific 
movement preparation, seems to reflect the processes necessary for a movement to be 
initiated immediately. 
The main aim of Experiments 3 and 4 was to compare participants' reported 
decision-times with both the RP and the LRP. The results of these studies suggest that 
reported decision-times were always after the start of the RP (this was partly because the 
RP recorded here started longer before the movement than that reported by Libet et al., 
1983). In contrast, decisions were often reported before the start of the LRP. We 
concluded that although there may be some anticipation of a future movement 
(represented by the RP) more than a second before the movement occurs, the specific 
processes necessary for the movement to be initiated (represented by the LRP) may not 
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How is a voluntary movement, such as a finger-tap, initiated? To Descartes, it 
seemed obvious that the decision to move is a mental event that occurs in the mind. The 
mind then affects the brain and causes it to stimulate nerves so that the relevant muscles 
contract to perform the movement (Descartes, trans. 1988). Descartes' intuition that 
conscious decisions have causal power over our actions still seems reasonable - even 
obvious - today, despite recent advances in understanding the brain processes that 
mediate voluntary movements. 
One such advance is the finding that distinctive types of movement-related brain 
activity can be identified when the EEG recordings from a number of movements are 
averaged together (Deecke, Grozinger, & Kornhuber, 1976; Kornhuber & Deecke, 1964 ). 
One variety of cortical activity ( called the Bereitschaftspotential, or Readiness Potential, 
RP) is a slow increase in brain activity that starts about a second before a voluntary hand 
movement, on average. Shibasaki (1992) noted that the amplitude of the RP is affected 
by psychological factors such as motivation, desire to move, and amount of force 
required for the movement, supporting the conclusion that the RP represents preparation 
1Much of the material of Chapter 1 and all of Chapter 2 have together been 
submitted to the journal Consciousness and Cognition under the title "Times of conscious 






to move. A later part of the RP, which starts about 400 msec before the 
movement, is more specific to the movement itself. 
2 
Consistent evidence that the RP is present so long before a movement prompted 
Libet and his colleagues to look at the role of the conscious will in movement initiation. 
They measured the relationship between the RP and the time of the conscious intention to 
move (Libet, Gleason, Wright, & Pearl, 1983). Their results suggested that the RP starts 
before the conscious intention to move; they concluded that voluntary movements are 
initiated unconsciously and that our actions are therefore not the results of conscious 
decisions. This conclusion has been controversial, especially because of its implications 
about the nature of free will. In the current thesis, we reexamined the evidence that led to 
Li bet et al.' s (1983) conclusions, tested an artifactual explanation of their results, and 
reexamined the temporal relationship between the reported times of conscious decisions 
to move and two measures of cortical movement preparation, the RP and the Lateralised 
Readiness Potential (LRP). Our goal was to better understand Libet's findings, and to 
explore the relationship between consciousness and brain processes. 
The Libet Paradigm 
In the experimental paradigm used by Li bet et al. (1983 ), the five participants 
viewed a circular "clock" that w-aS labeled like a stopwatch, presented on an 
oscilloscope. A dot moved around the perimeter of the clock at a constant rate, with a 
complete circuit taking approximately 2.6 sec. In each trial, the participant's task was to 











movement, with a vigorous flexion of the right wrist or fingers. The participant 
was asked to use the clock to "note and later report the time of appearance of his [sic] 
conscious awareness of 'wanting' to perform a given self-initiated movement" (Libet et 
al., 1983, p 627, italics in original). The reported time was referred to as W (for "time of 
Wanting to move"). 
There were two different methods for the reports of W to be made. In the 
Absolute reporting condition, participants simply read out the time, to the nearest "clock-
second", where they thought the dot had been at the time when they decided to move (the 
dot actually moved one clock second about every 43 msec ). During the Order reporting 
condition, a reference dot appeared at a random point on the clock after each movement 
had been made, and participants had to report whether the time of their decision to move 
was before, simultaneous with, or after the time indicated by the reference dot. Libet et 
al. (1983) noted that the Order and Absolute methods yielded similar results but that the 
Order method was less demanding for the participants. 
Figure 1 shows the results from one Order block of 40 trials from the study by 
Libet et al. (1983). Each dot represents a single trial and the horizontal axis shows the 
clock time at which the reference dot appeared on the trial, relative to the position of the 
dot at the time of the movement2. The movement as defined by the onset ofEMG 
2 Before each block, the experimenter specified the 600 msec period which would 
be tested in that block (in Figure 1, the period is from 400 msec before to 200 msec after 











activity in the responding arm occurred at O msec, with negative times being 
before the movement. The vertical axis shows the participant's report. For example, on a 
trial in which the reference dot was placed where it had been 50 msec after the 
movement, Figure 1 indicates that the participant said that the dot was placed after the 
intention to move had occurred. In addition, on a trial in which the reference dot was 
placed where it had been 100 msec before the movement, the participant reported that the 
dot was simultaneous with the intention to move (see Figure 1 ). In this block, the mean 
W was calculated to be -145 msec3. Across both reporting methods, the 37 block means 
shown in Libet etal.'s (1983) Table 1 had a mean of-204 msec (and standard error of 12 
msec). 
and the position of the reference dot for each trial was selected at random from these 
times. 
3The times tested were specified relative to the time of the movement, and were 
15 msec apart. To calculate the mean W for the Order Blocks, Libet et al. took the time of 
the last point tested, and subtracted 1 division (15 msec) for each report of "W first", and 
half a division (7.5 msec) for each "together" report, and then subtracted an additional 7.5 






































-400 -300 -200 -100 0 100 200 
Position of Reference Dot (msec) 
Figure 1. Actual results from one Order block, (adapted from Libet et al. 1983, p. 
628). The horizontal axis shows the time of the reference dot (relative to the 
movement at time 0) and the vertical axis indicates whether the participant reported 
that the reference dot's position was before, simultaneous with, or after the point 
where it had been at the time of the intention to move. Each dot represents the 
results of one trial. 
During the same trials in which W was obtained, Libet et al. (1983) measured 
brain activity in the motor cortex with scalp electrodes, using the same technique as 
Deecke et al. (1976), to find out when movement preparation in the brain began. 
Averaging the trials together in blocks of 40 to reduce random noise in the signals, they 
r 
estimated that the RP had started an average of 53 5 msec before the hand movement 4. 
4This RP, an average over 20 ofLibet et al. 's 37 blocks, was shorter than that 
recorded by Deecke et al. (1976) and others. In other blocks (12 of 3 8) the RPs were 
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Since the average RP onset started approximately 300 msec before the average 
value for W, Libet et al. concluded that movement preparation in the brain starts before 
the conscious intention to move, and thus that even spontaneous voluntary movements 
are initiated unconsciously. 
Criticisms of Libet's Conclusions 
6 
There has been considerable criticism ofLibet's conclusions (see e.g. the 
commentaries to Libet, 1985), probably in part because they seem to threaten the implicit 
belief that our actions are determined by conscious decisions. These criticisms have 
largely centered on what the RP and W actually mean, and whether Lib et et al. (1983) 
succeeded in measuring W accurately. For example, several commentators have 
questioned whether the RP which occurred before the decision has been established as 
reflecting processes involved in movement preparation (Eccles, 1985; Ringo, 1985; 
Rugg, 1985; Stamm, 1985). The question of what the RP represents is addressed in 
Chapter 3, while the nature and accuracy ofW are discussed below. 
What Does W Mean? 
Li bet (1985) draws very wide-ranging conclusions based on the findings about the 
movement. Evidence from Libet, Wright, and Gleason (1982) suggested that RPs of 
about -1000 msec were associated with "preplanning" (i.e., with a report from the 
participant that one or more of their hand movements in that block had been preplanned 
















reported time of the decision to move. For example, he argued that since 
movements are initiated unconsciously, we cannot be responsible for the actions that we 
consider making. Instead, there is sufficient time between the time that an intention to 
move becomes conscious and the time that the movement occurs for us to be able to veto 
an undesirable action. Arguably, the existence of a veto is not established by Libet et 
al. 's (1983) results, but is necessary for the argument that free will exists even though 
movements are initiated unconsciously. In any case, Libet (1985) hinted that the reason 
why moral codes such as the Ten Commandments are phrased in the negative ("Thou 
shalt not. .. ") is that conscious control of our own behaviour is limited to our ability to 
decide not to make a planned movement. 
In addition, Libet argued that although we often consciously weigh up different 
courses of action, "the actual motor execution even of a deliberately preselected 
voluntary act" might also be initiated unconsciously (Libet, 1985, p539), so that even 
long-contemplated plans cannot be implemented under conscious control. 
Libet (1985) seems to imply that we can only be responsible for actions 
performed under our conscious control, and since the results ofLibet et al. (1983) show 
that movements are not initiated consciously, it was necessary to postulate the veto 
(which allows movements to be prevented some time after initiation) in order to retain the 
concept of conscious control of our actions. 
With so much apparently depending on the time of the decision to move, it seems 
reasonable to enquire whether the W reported by participants really is a valid measure of 




















it is not, either because the movement tested was not truly free (Bridgeman, 
1985; Na.a tan en, 1985), or because the decision to make the movement was not conscious 
(Breitmeyer, 1985; Danto, 1985; Rugg, 1985; Underwood & Neimi, 1985; Vanderwol( 
1985; Van Gulick, 1985). The argument that the decision to move was not free was 
based on the observation that the experimenter dictated the form of the movement, and 
that the participant was required to make a certain number of movements before the 
experimental session could finish. However, since the participant was able to initiate the 
movement at any time during the trial, there seems to be at least some minimum level of 
freedom to choose when to move which is worth looking at. 
Whether the decision to move is conscious is harder to determine, since many 
actions can be performed "automatically", without a conscious decision. However, even 
if the decision to initiate a movement is not usually conscious, the results of Li bet et al. 
suggest that people are able to attend to the decision if requested to do so. As Figure 1 
shows, participants' reports about the time of their decisions to move were not random: 
times long before the movement were likely to be reported as also being before the 
decision, while times closer to the movement were more likely to be described as after 
the decision. 
It is not completely clear how to characterise the event that subjects made W 
reports about, since many terms for the event have been used interchangeably. Li bet used 
mean Was the time of "a conscious intention to act" (Libet 1985, p529), while specifying 
that W had been obtained by asking each subject to report the "time of appearance of his 
[sic] conscious awareness of "wanting" to perform" the movement (Lib et et al, 1983, 

















or 'intention' or 'decision' to move, though subjects usually settled for the words 
'wanting' or 'urge"' (Libet et al, 1983 p627), and that the letter W for the mean was used 
because subjects preferred the term 'wanting to move' to describe the event 
With so many possible meanings for W (wanting, urge, intention, decision, 
awareness of wanting, urge, intention or decision), each with a slightly different shade of 
meaning, it is hard even to see what type of evidence to look for, to show that any term is 
a more or less accurate description than any other. One possibility is to look at the 
distribution of W over time. For example, if many W reports fell after the time of the 
movement, we would be unwilling to describe Was an efficacious decision to move. To 
avoid begging the question about what W means, in the current thesis W should be 
understood to mean the time reported by subjects who have been asked to indicate the 
time of the decision to make a voluntary hand movement. This definition ofW is useful 
in that it leaves room for us to conclude that participants are simply wrong about the time 
of their decision to move. Some people may wish to argue that it is not possible for 
participants to be wrong about their subjective experiences. After all, there is no other 
evidence about these experiences apart from the participants' reports. Dennett's (1982) 
concept of heterophenomenology is useful here, since it allows us to accept in good faith 
that a participant is telling the truth about how things seem to him or her, without being 
committed to believing that the participant's version of events is the correct one. 
However, in the absence of any method that could resolve these conceptual arguments, 
we will accept Was a valid measure of the time of the decision to move, based on its 























The accuracy of W 
One early concern was whether Libet's results were replicable. However, Keller 
and Heckhausen (1990) used Libet et al. 's (1983) paradigm and obtained very similar 
results, with a mean RP onset of-494 msec (with a standard deviation of 117 msec), 
followed by the mean reported decision time, at-205 msec (60 msec), relative to the 
movement. (Recall that Li bet et al.' s average times for RP onset and W were -53 5 msec 
and -204 msec respectively). 
Other commentators asked the methodological question of whether W had been 
measured accurately. The conclusions ofLibet et al. (1983) depend critically on the 
measurement ofW, and the accuracy of their technique has been hotly debated. One way 
that inaccuracy could come into the measurement ofW would be if the intention to move 
were extended overtime (Latto, 1985; Marks, 1985; Ringo, 1985). In that case, there 
would be no way to tell whether different participants were consistently reporting the 
time of the onset, offset, or perhaps peak of the intention. It is also possible that a single 
participant could make reports based on different aspects of the intention in different 
trials without realising it. The possibility of trial-to-trial variation is an important 
consideration, and we will return to it later. 
Other delays and latencies within the participants' information processing 
systems, such as the time taken to notice the intention to move or to perceive the position 
of the dot, could also contribute to inaccuracy in W reports by causing a particular dot 
position to seem (and be remembered as) simultaneous with the intention even though it 


















Wasserman, 1985). Any delays would make the reported W systematically 
different from the time that the intention to move had actually been experienced. For 
example, there might be a delay while the participants shifted their attention from one 
task to another. Participants in the Libet paradigm were supposed to remember the 
position of the moving dot at the instant they were aware of intending or wanting to 
move. However, it is notoriously difficult to do two things at once (e.g., Pashler, 1984), 
so participants probably had to switch attention between detecting the onset of a 
conscious intention to move, perceiving the position of the moving dot, and noting the 
position for later retrieval. Depending on the order in which the tasks were performed, 
this might lead to the reported W being consistently earlier or later than the actual W, as 
well as more variable. 
Libet's reply: Correct/or bias using Mand S 
Libet et al. (1983) attempted to evaluate and allow for the systematic delays 
described above by using control conditions. They pointed out that bias in W reports was 
impossible to measure directly, because the experimenter had no access to the 
participant's conscious intention to move except via the participant's report. So in order 
to measure any bias that might exist, Libet et al. also asked participants to report the time 
of control stimuli, which could be timed objectively as well as subjectively. The mean of 
the W reports was compared with the means of reports about the times of two other 
events: the feeling that the hand was starting to move (M) and the perception ofa mild 
electrical shock (S). 
For the S reports, participants watched the clock while waiting for a mild shock 
·( 
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that was delivered to electrodes on the back of the participant's hand at 
irregular intervals. After each trial the participant reported the "time of awareness of the 
sensation," (Libet et al., 1983, p 627, italics in original), using either the Absolute or 
Order method described above. Libet et al. had anticipated that S would be accurate, or 
perhaps slightly later than the actual stimulation time to allow for processing time. 
However, the mean reported time of the sensation was 47 msec before the electrical pulse 
had been delivered. (Data from Libet et al. 's Table 1 show that over the 22 S blocks, the 
reported time of the sensation had an average of-47 msec and a standard error of21 
msec.) They argued that since Wand S used the same reporting procedure, any error due 
to reporting methods or the participant's personal characteristic bias should be the same 
for both tasks. The sensation was reported as perceived before the event it was caused 
by, and assuming that the same was true for the intention to move, then the reported W 
would be 4 7 msec before the actual intention, which would therefore have occurred at 
206 - 47 = 159 msec before the movement. This "correction" strengthened Libet et al. 's 
conclusions by increasing the degree to which the intention to move followed RP onset. 
For M, the other control task, the method used was similar to that for obtaining 
W, as described above, with participants being required to make a sudden hand 
movement. The difference was that instead of the intention to move, the participant was 
instructed to report where the dot was at the moment of the "awareness that he/she 
'actually moved"' (Libet et al, 1983, p 627, italics in original). Like S, the reported time 
of the feeling of movement, M, was slightly earlier than the event it was presumably 
caused by, with a mean of 86 msec before the start of the movement, as indicated by an 

















that the means of the 20 M blocks have an average of-86 msec, and a standard 
error of 20 msec.) 
13 
The results obtained with Mand S suggest that the intention to move is slightly 
later than is indicated by the reported Ws. Thus, the amount of systematic error is both 
too small and in the wrong direction to account for Li bet et al.' s (1983) conclusion that 
the RP occurs before the decision to move. In contrast, the amount of random error in W 
does suggest an alternative explanation for Libet's results, as outlined below. 
Overview of the thesis 
In Chapter 1, we have reviewed Lib et et al. 's original experimental methods, 
results and conclusions. A number of criticisms ofLibet et al.'s conclusions have been 
discussed, and two of the major criticisms are addressed and tested in the following 
studies. In Chapter 2 we describe two experiments designed to test the possibility that 
Li bet et al.' s results may be explained by a smearing artifact that occurs during EEG 
averagmg. 
Chapter 3 addresses the possibility that the Readiness Potential, which Libet et al. 
used as an indication of cortical movement preparation, may reflect cortical activity 
related to the anticipation of a future movement, rather than being specific to movement 
initiation. In this chapter, we review the evidence regarding both the Readiness Potential, 
and a more recently-discovered measurement of hand-specific movement preparation: the 
Lateralised Readiness Potential. Two studies are also described in which both forms of 
















move, are recorded. As well as testing the possibility that movement-specific 
cortical activity may not occur until after the reported time of a conscious decision to 
move, these studies provide further replications of Libet et al. 's original results. In 
Chapter 4, the results of all four studies are summarised and discussed. Libet's 





















Libet et al. (1983) found evidence suggesting that cortical movement preparation 
begins before the conscious decision to move. In the current chapter, we argue that Libet 
et al.' s results could still have been obtained even if on each individual trial the reported 
time of the conscious decision was earlier than the start of movement preparation. This 
could happen because of an artifact that occurs when measuring the latency of averaged 
brain-wave recordings, if the variability in the reported time of the decision to move were 
large enough. To test this alternative account ofLibet et al. 's findings, we measured the 
time of the intention to move and used temporal order judgment techniques to determine 
the full distribution of the reported times. The amount of variability was larger than is 
usual for temporal order judgments, and this was consistent with the hypothesis that the 
earliest reported time of a decision to move was before the time ofLibet et al. 's mean 
movement preparation onset. We conclude that the decision to move may have occurred 
before the start of movement preparation in each individual trial ofLibet et al. 's original 
study, contrary to Libet et al.'s conclusions. We also found large changes in reported 
decision times across experiments. 
The artifact-based explanation for Libet et al 's results 
One of the goals of this thesis was to investigate the possibility of an EEG 
smearing artifact that - with sufficient variation from trial to trial - could produce Libet et 





















decision to move had preceded the onset of the RP on every single trial. 
It is well-known in EEG research that the latency of EEG components depends on 
whether the latencies are measured from individual trials and then averaged, or the 
latency is measured from the averaged wave-form (Callaway, Halliday, Naylor & 
Thouvenin, 1984 ). This is because of a smearing artifact that occurs when EEGs are 
averaged. The smearing artifact means that the onset latency of an EEG component in a 
recording that has been averaged over several trials is close to the earliest onset of that 
component in all the individual trials contributing to the average (Meyer, Osman, Irwin & 
Yantis, 1988). Specifically, the onset of most of the RPs obtained by Libet et al. (1983) 
may have been much later (i.e., closer to the movement) than the onset of the average 
wave-form would indicate. If just a few trials ( out of each block of 40) had RP onsets at 
about -500 msec, then the average wave-form over the whole block would have an RP 
onset at about -500 msec even if most of the other trials had RP onsets much closer to the 
movement. 
The left column in Figure 2 is an illustration of the smearing artifact. The brain 
activity from four separate trials is shown in the top four graphs, and the onset time of the 
movement preparation (RP) varies from -550 msec to -150 msec, relative to the 
movement at O msec. When the recordings from these trials are averaged together 
(lowest graph) the latency of the RP in the averaged wave-form reflects the latency of the 
trial in which the RP started earliest. 
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an EEG component and that this smearing might have produced Libet et 
al. 's (1983) results. On each trial the idealized EEG component is represented as a 
linear increase in EEG starting at time t relative to the movement at t=O. On trials 
1-4 in the left column, the component begins at t = -550, -150, -450, and -250 msec 
respectively. In the average waveform (shown in the lowest graph), the onset of the 
component (i.e. the change from baseline) can be seen at about t = -550 msec, 
corresponding to the earliest individual-trial onset. In the right column, the 
components in trials 1-4 again have different onset times and W (the reported time 
of the decision to move, shown as a black dot) is 50 msec before the component 
starts in each trial. In the overall average {bottom graph), the average time ofW is 
actually after the onset of the component in the averaged waveform because of the 
smearing of the EEG waveforms . 
The implications of this smearing for Li bet et al. 's results are shown in the right 
hand column of Figure 2, where the reported time of the intention to move (W) is shown 
for each trial by a black dot. As in the Libet experiment, the average W-time is after the 
RP onset of the averaged waveform (lowest graph), even though Wis before RP onset on 
each of the four individual trials shown. The smearing artifact presents a challenge to 
Li bet's results by raising the possibility that the averaged results may not reflect the order 
of the RP onset and W in individual trials. 
As illustrated in Figure 3, the extent to which smearing is a problem for Libet et 
al. 's results depends on the amount of variability in the W reports and RP onsets. If 
variability is large, as shown on the left, the onset of RP can appear to precede the 
average W by a substantial amount. If variability is small, as shown on the right, then the 
smearing artifact would have little effect on the results . 
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a larger distortion on averaged results when there is large inter-trial 
variability ofW or RP onset (left column) than when variability is small (right 
column). In the left column, W-times range from -100 msec to -550 msec with an 
average of-275 msec, while the Ws in the right column range from -270 msec to -330 
msec, and have an average of -305 msec. 
Given that the smearing effect depends critically on the amount of trial-to-trial 
variability ofW and RP onset, measures of the variability ofW are needed to interpret 
Libet's results. However, almost all ofLibet et al. 's (1983) W data are presented in the 
form of averages over the 40 trials in each block, so they are not informative about the 
distribution of the reports within each block. 
In spite of this, it is clear that there is some variability in the W-reports. For 
Absolute Blocks (shown in Li bet et al. 's, 1983, Table 1) the standard errors of the mean 
W ranged from 10 to 24 msec. Given that the standard error is the standard deviation 
divided by the square root of the sample size, this suggests that the standard deviations 
within the blocks were between approximately 60 and 150 msec. For the Order Blocks, 
standard errors from 18 to 46 msec were reported, indicating within-block standard 
deviations of 110-300 msec. Other evidence of trial-to trial variation comes from the raw 
data from two blocks that were shown in Libet et al. 's (1983) Figure 1, in which the 
reported Ws in some trials were considerably different to the mean W over the block. 
For example, in the Order block (which is shown in our Figure 1) there was a difference 
of75 msec between the earliest time reported as simultaneous with the intention to move 
(at -220 msec) and the mean W for that block (of -145 msec). In the Absolute block (not 



















-213 msec, and the average W of-90 msec. 
In summary, although there is clearly substantial variability in W reports, it is not 
so clear exactly how much there is. One of the goals of the experiments in this thesis was 
to measure the amount of variability in W, using the methodology of temporal order 
judgment (TOJ) studies, to find out whether it is sufficient to account for Li bet et al.' s 
results. Other goals are described below . 
Temporal Order Judgment Methodology 
To evaluate our alternative explanation, we estimated the amount of variability in 
W-reports using TOJ techniques. The participant's task was very similar to that used in 
Li bet et al.' s Order condition. However, we used TOJ methods to analyse the 
participants' before/after reports, so that as well as measuring the mean and variability of 
participants' reports, we could also see whether the distribution of W reports over time 
was wide enough for the artifact to produce Li bet et al.' s results. Specifically, we were 
looking at the start of the distribution, to find the earliest time that participants ever 
reported as being after the decision to move. If the decision were really before the start 
of the RP on every trial, then the earliest decisions would be before the RP onsets. The 
earliest decisions appear as the start of the TOJ distribution; for example, if a point in 
time is only reported as "after the decision" on 5% of trials, that means that the earliest 
5% of decisions are before that time. As discussed above the earliest RP onsets are 
reflected in the onset time of the RP in the average wave of the EEG. 


















and then judges which of the two stimuli seemed to happen first. The analysis 
assumes that the two stimuli (x and y) were presented at times tx and ty respectively, 
separated by ty - tx = d msec (so that dis positive when xis first). The probability of the 
participant's report "x happened first" varies as a function of d: that is, the distribution of 
Pr(x first I d) can be expressed as F(d). When dis large and negative Pr(x first I d) is 
approximately 0, and when dis large and positive Pr(x first Id) is approximately 1, so 
that F(d) behaves like a cumulative frequency distribution (Sternberg & Knoll, 1973; 
Ulrich, 1987). Sternberg and Knoll noted that the distribution F(d) contains information 
about both the central tendency and the variability of the reports. For example, the point 
of subjective simultaneity (PSS) is the median of the distribution: the value of d for 
which both reports are equally likely. It is usually different from the point of actual 
simultaneity, at d = 0. 
In addition, the slope of the distribution is a measure of the amount of variability 
in participants' responses. The difference threshold (or DL) equals half the difference 
between the d where Pr(x first I d) = 0.25 and the d where Pr(x first I d) = 0. 75. That 
ensures that the DL is smaller for more precise judgments: where the judgments go from 
being mostly "x first" to mostly 'y first,,, with only a small change in d. Some early 
experiments (Sternberg & Knoll, 1973, cite Hirsh & Sherrick, 1961) showed that many 
pairs stimuli have a DL of only about 18 msec, but that d still needs to change by about 




















The immediate purpose of the first two experiments was to use TOJ techniques to 
measure the amount of variability associated with W reports, with the ultimate goal of 
judging whether the amount measured was sufficient (in combination with the smearing 
artifact) to raise doubts about Libet et al. 's (1983) conclusions. Specifically, we wanted 
to know whether the earliest reported decision to move could have occurred before the 
earliest onset of cortical movement preparation. If so, it is possible that the decision was 
before movement preparation on every trial. As explained above, the earliest onset of 
brain activity in any individual trial is reflected in the start of activity in the grand 
average over all trials, due to the smearing artifact. In the current chapter, we use for 
comparison previous brain activity results (Libet et al., 1983; Keller & Heckhausen, 
1990) showing that cortical movement preparation starts about 500 msec before the 
movement. To find out about the earliest reported decision time, we constructed the 
entire probability distribution of participants' reports (see Ulrich, 1987), to see whether 
there were any decisions reported before the start of cortical movement preparation. 
In addition to measuring the variability of W, we also measured the variability of 
TOJ s for stimulus detection and for the feeling of actually moving; the two control 
conditions used by Li bet et al. (1983). This allowed us to compare the distribution of VI 
with the distributions of other reported times. For example, some commentators (Latto, 
1985; Marks, 1985; Ringo, 1985) have suggested that the decision to move is spread out 












whether W reports were more spread out than reports about other events. 
In Experiment 1, participants made judgments about the onsets of intention to 
move and, in separate blocks of trials, about the onsets of external stimuli. We used a 
tone (T), rather than Li bet et al.' s (1983) electric shock (S), but the principle of an event 
that can be timed both subjectively and objectively was the same. In Experiment 2, 
participants made judgments about both Wand the start of the hand movement (M). We 
also varied the speed of the moving dot in Experiment 1. Using methods similar to those 
of Li bet et al., Wundt (1904; cited by Breitmeyer, 1985) had shown that judgments 
depend on the speed of the dot as well as the modality of the reference stimulus . 
Our major question was whether the variability in W would be large enough to 
account for Libet's finding that the RP starts approximately 500 msec before the mean 
W. Since the RP onset is determined by the earliest RPs (as discussed in our Alternative 




Twenty-seven first-year Psychology students from the University of Otago 
participated in one SO-minute session, in partial fulfillment of a course requirement. Data 
from 3 participants were excluded from the analysis for having standard deviations more 
than 2 standard deviations above the mean value (see Results section). The remaining 24 
participants (5 male) had an average age of 20.25 years. 
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The presentation of instructions and the clock were controlled by a computer, 
which also recorded the participant's responses. Instructions and the clock were 
displayed on a standard colour computer monitor. Participants responded by pressing 
one of two keys on a standard computer keyboard (the left index finger rested on the [z] 
key, the right index finger on the slash[/] key). During the Tone Task, participants wore 
headphones that delivered tones to both ears simultaneously. 
Procedure 
Tone Task. Participants were seated in front of a computer monitor. The Tone 
Task began with a warning stimulus (a white dot, displayed in the centre ofa blank 
screen for 1000 msec). After a random delay with a duration uniformly distributed 
between 1000 and 2000 msec, the clock (which is described below) appeared on the 
monitor for up to 7500 msec, and the participant watched a dot moving round the clock-
face. A tone was presented during the trial, with a delay from the onset of the clock to 
the tone of2000+X msec, where the mean X was 2000 msec and X followed an 
exponential distribution so that the instantaneous probability of tone onset would remain 
constant throughout the trial. The participant's task was to note the position of the dot at 
the time of the start of the tone and then report it: the method of reporting is described 
below. After the participant's report, there was a pause of approximately 1-2 sec before 
the next trial started. In 6. 7% of the trials no tone was presented, so there was simply a 1-


















Decision Task. Each trial in the Decision Task started with an L or R 
displayed on the monitor for 1000 msec, informing the participant that he or she should 
move the left or right hand respectively, in that trial. The hand to be used was 
randomised, in an attempt to ensure that each movement was prepared separately, and did 
not become merely part of a sequence of movements. As in the Tone Task, the duration 
of the delay before the appearance of the clock was uniformly distributed between 1000 
and 2000 msec. The participants' task was to tap the appropriate finger any time within 
the 7500 msec that the clock was visible, note the position of the dot at the time that they 
decided to "go now", and then report that position as described below. After the report, 
there was a pause of about 1-2 sec before the next trial. 
The participants failed to make the finger-tap within the required time on less than 
1% of trials. On these trials, the participant was not prompted for a report, and the next 
trial was initiated after a 1-2 sec pause. Participants were told that the movement was 
supposed to be spontaneous, with the participant moving as soon as it occurred to them to 
do so, instead of planning to move later when the dot was in a different position. 
The Clock. The clock was a bright blue rectangular outline, 1.5 cm wide and 11 
cm tall, on a black background in the centre of the monitor5• The rectangle was labelled 
inside the perimeter from 1-12 (evenly spaced around the perimeter) with 5 small 
5 A tall, narrow clock was used to minimize horizontal eye movements for 




















divisions between each pair of numbers. The "hand" of the clock was a white 
dot moving around the clock at one of two speeds. Another white dot between the 9 and 
the 3 was the fixation point, which participants were asked to look at during each trial. 
The clock was shown for up to 7500 msec per trial when no event took place. If 
there was a tone ( or keypress ), the dot continued moving normally for some time after the 
event before disappearing and reappearing at a reference point The position of the 
reference point was determined separately for each trial as described below. The time 
that the dot continued moving varied, according to a uniform distribution, from 500 to 
800 msec after the tone ( or keypress) to reduce the probability that the offset of the 
moving dot could provide a visual cue for the participants. 
The dot moved around the perimeter of the clock at one of two speeds: fast (1250 
msec per revolution - a linear speed of 0.2 m/sec, closely approximating the speed used in 
previous studies) or slow (2500 msec per revolution, or 0.1 m/sec ). In the Decision Task 
the participants were told that they had 6 or 3 revolutions to make the movement, in the 
fast and slow conditions respectively. 
Reporting the Time. The method used for participants to report the time was 
adapted from the Order Method used by Libet et al. (1983). For both tasks, participants 
were asked to remember the position of the dot at the time of a particular event ( when 
they decided to move, or heard a tone). After the trial the clock was displayed with a 
stationary reference dot somewhere on the clock, and participants had to indicate whether 
the position they remembered was before or after the position of this reference dot 
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to signify 'lhe event happened before the reference dot" and with the right hand 
to signify "the event happened after the reference dot." 
28 
Kaembach's (1991) weighted up-and-down method was used to adjust the 
position of the reference dot and adaptively map out the psychometric functions. The 
position of the reference dot was selected from one of two randomly interleaved 
estimation series (separately for each hand) and was specified relative to either the tone 
(Tone task) or the keypress (Decision task). One series was designed to estimate the 75th 
percentile (the time that the participant reported as being before the event 75% of the 
time) the reference dot first appeared where it had been 100 msec before the keypress. 
The dot moved 10 msec later if the participant reported that the dot was before the event, 
or 30 msec earlier if the participant said the dot was qfter the event. Similarly, the other 
series was designed to estimate the 25th percentile (the time that was described as ''before 
the event" on 25% of trials). For this series, the dot started 100 msec after the keypress, 
and moved 30 msec later (if the dot was reported as first) or 10 msec earlier (if the event 
was reported as first). The target percentiles of25 and 75 were chosen to produce a 
reasonable number of tests near the ends of each participant's psychometric function. 
Design. Each session consisted of 12 blocks of20 trials. Each combination of 
Task and Dot Speed was tested in 3 consecutive blocks. The first half of a session 
consisted of one task at both speeds, and the second half contained the other task, with 
the speeds occurring in the same order as in the first half. There was a break of 2 minutes 
before the new instructions from the experimenter between the halves of the session, as 
well as a 2-minute break in the middle of each half. Task Order and Dot Speed Order 











hand trials in each Decision Task block, randomly intermixed. 
Note on timing of W. In the studies by Libet et al. (1983) and Keller and 
Heckhausen (1990), both W (the reported time of the decision to move) and the brain 
activity were timed with reference to the start of the movement. This was determined by 
measuring the muscle activity (EMG) in the moving arm - the vigorous flexion of wrist 
or fingers produced a sharp spike in the recorded EMG, and in each trial the beginning of 
this spike was defined as O msec. 
In the current paper (where participants tapped on a keyboard, rather than just 
flexing their hands in mid-air) we defined O msec as the time of the keypress, rather than 
measuring EMG onset. The advantage of this method is that the time ofa keypress can 
be established with more precision and less ambiguity than the threshold EMG. A 
disadvantage of the decision is that it reduces the ease with which we can compare W 
across experiments, because we do not know the latency between EMG onset ( as it would 
have been measured by Libet et ai., 1983) and the keypress6• For example, a decision 
reported at -200 msec (relative to EMG onset) in Libet et al. might be equivalent to one 
reported at about -250 msec (relative to the keypress) in the current study. 
6The lag between EMG onset and the registering of a movement by mechanical 
means might be 30 msec for a "brisk voluntary contraction of hand muscle" (Shibasaki, 


















For each participant separately, the reported TOJs were analysed by converting 
the reference-dot times and the before/after judgments into monotonic psychometric 
functions. These functions measured the probability (for each point in time, relative to 
the tone or keypress) that the participant would report that the event (tone or decision) 
was before the reference dot. The probability went from 0% for reference points a long 
time before the event to 100% for points a long time after the event, and was manipulated 
to be monotonic using the Spearman-Karber method (Ulrich, 1987). Psychometric 
functions were calculated separately for each combination of Task (Tone, Decision) and 
Dot Speed (Fast, Slow). In the Decision Task, Left- and Right-hand movements were 
also analysed separately. For each function, the mean, standard deviation, median, and 
DL were calculated. Following Li bet et al. (1983 ), reports about the decision to move are 
described as W and reports about the time of the tone are referred to as T. Three of the 
participants had extremely wide distributions, with SDs more than 2 SDs above the 
average SD, and these participants were excluded from the initial analysis 7. The 
psychometric functions of the remaining 24 participants were pooled to create an average 
function, which is shown in Figure 4. The figure shows that the functions obtained for 
7Similarly, Keller and Heckhausen (1990) reported 7 participants with W values 
between 70 and 370 msec before the movement, and one participant with a W that was 
806 msec after the movement.. Excluding this participant altered the overall group W 





















reports about the tone and the movement are very similar, and that none of the 
reported decisions to move were more than 200 msec before the time of the movement. 
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Figure 4. Overall psychometric functions from Experiment 1, separately for each 
Task (tone/decide) and Dot Speed (fast/slow), pooled over 24 participants. For each 
time relative to the keypress or tone onset (time 0), the figure shows the probability 
of a report that the event (decision to move or hearing the tone) occurred before 
that time. Note that the reported times of deciding to move (and hearing the tone) 
are all less than 250 msec before the time of the movement(or the time of the actual 
tone). 
Inspection of the psychometric functions shown in Figure 4 also suggests that 
reports about the tone (T) were earlier, more variable, and more affected by differences in 
Dot Speed, relative to reports about the decision to move (W). T was reported earlier 










Dot Speed on W was not significant. The statistical analysis described below 
confirmed these differences, and also produced some evidence that the amount of 
practice affected the times reported. The two tasks were conceptually quite different, so 
they were analysed separately before being combined. 
We made a total of 128 statistical comparisons ( with 4 dependent variables in 
each of 8 conditions in the Tone Task, 16 in the Decide Task and 8 comparisons between 
the tasks). Of these comparisons, 34 were significant at p<O. l level or higher, including 
24 that were significant at p<0.05 level or higher. But with so many statistical tests, it is 
likely that about 13 of the 34 significant results were Type 1 errors. To minimise the 
effect of these Type 1 errors, we only report results where the two related measures 
(mean and median, or standard deviation and DL) were both significant. These values 
are shown in Tables 1-3; all significance tests reported are based on F tests with degrees 
of freedom (1,20). 
Tone task 
Analysis of the central tendency ofreports about the Tone Task was conducted 
using 2x2x2 ANOV As, with factors of Dot Speed (Fast and Slow), Dot Speed Order 
(Fast-first and Slow-first) and Task Order (Tone-first and Decide-first), on the means and 
medians. The reported time of the tone, T, was significantly earlier than the actual tone, 
with a mean of-59 msec and a median of-61 msec (see Table 1, bothps<0.05). The 
difference replicates the one reported by Libet et al. (1983), who also found that a 
sensory event was reported earlier than it had actually happened. Table 1 also shows that 
the mean and median ofT were earlier for Slow dots than Fast dots (bothps <0.05). 
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Average results from Experiment 1 (n = 24) as a function of task and dot speed. Mean, 
median, standard deviation (SD), and difference threshold (DL) of the times at which the 
events were reported. All the times are in msec relative to the time of the tone (Tone 
task) or the time of the keypress (Decide task). Negative values indicate the time is 








































Task Order by Dot Speed Order interaction for mean, median, standard deviation (SD), 
























































Dot Speed by Dot Speed Order interaction for mean and median from Experiment 1 (see 





























Neither of the Order conditions had a main effect on the central 
tendency, but there was an interaction between the two Order conditions for both mean 
and median (as shown in Table 2, bothps <0.05). Tones were reported especially early by 
participants who started with the Tone Task and slow dots or with the Decision Task and 
fast dots, as compared with participants who started with the other two combinations. 
This result is hard to interpret, especially in the absence of any overall effect of either Dot 
Speed Order or Task Order. The interaction seems to indicate that the unique 
combination of Task and Dot Speed experienced first affected the participants' reported 
times (for both the Tone and Decide task equally) for the rest of the experimental session, 
but it is not clear why it should do so. 
Analysis of the variability ofreports in the Tone Task was conducted using 
ANOV As with the same factors as above on the SDs and DLs. Overall, the average SD 
ofT was 72 msec, and the average DL was 63 msec. There was evidence that the Tone-
first, Fast-first group had larger variability than the other three groups (see Table 2), 
suggesting that the Tone Task was especially hard to do first the interaction between 
Task Order and Dot Speed Order was significant for the standard deviation (p<0.05) and 
approached significance for the DL (p<0.1 ). 
Decision task 
Analysis of the central tendency of reports in the Decision Task was performed 
using 2x2x2x2 ANOV As, with factors of Hand (Left and Right), Dot Speed (Fast and 










Decide-first), on the means and medians. The mean reported time of the 
Decision to move was marginally different from the time of the keypress (-16.1 msec, 
p<0.1 ), while the median was not significantly different to zero (-11.1 msec, p>0.3; see 
Table 1 ). Since the EMG onset would have been at least 30 msec before the keypress 
(Shibasaki, 1992), both the mean and median are almost certainly after EMG onset. In 
contrast, the mean W reported by Li bet et al. (1983) was 200 msec before the EMG 
onset. There was also a Dot Speed by Dot Speed Order interaction, which seemed to 
indicate a practice effect since the Dot Speed that was experienced second was reported 
earlier (ps for mean and median both <0.05; see Table 3). 
Analysis of the variability of reports in the Decision Task was performed using 
2x2x2x2 ANOV As on the standard deviations and DLs, with the same factors as above. 
The average standard deviation was 61 msec, and the average DL was 45 msec (see Table 
1 ). There were no significant effects in these ANOV As. 
Combined analysis 
A further set of analyses compared results for the Tone and Decision tasks, 
collapsing across hand for the latter. To look at the central tendency, ANOV As were 
performed on the mean and median, over the factors of Task (Decision and Tone), Dot 
Speed (Fast and Slow), Task Order (Decide-first and Tone-first) and Dot Speed Order 
(Fast-first and Slow-first). The comparison confirmed that T (relative to the tone) was 
significantly earlier than W (relative to the keypress) with means of-59 and -16 msec and 

















The amount that Slow dots were earlier than Fast dots was not 
significant overall, but it was larger for the Tone task (where it was significant) than the 
Decision task (mean and median both had ps<0.05; see Table 1). The interaction 
between the two Order factors (which was present in the Tone task results- see Table 2) 
was also significant in both the mean and median of the overall analysis. 
To look at the variability, ANOV As were performed on the standard deviation 
and DL, using the same factors as above. Only one significant result was obtained: the 
interaction between the two Order factors (which had appeared in both of the variability 
measures of the Tone Task) was not significant overall, but was marginally greater for 
the Tone Task than for the Decision task (ps for SD and DL both <0.1 O; see Table 2). 
Excluded Participants 
Our estimates of variability are conservative in that we excluded the 3 participants 
with the largest variability. For completeness therefore, we also calculated what the 
results would have been ifwe had included these participants, so that n=27. We 
performed a 2x2 ANOV A looking at task and speed ( collapsing across groups) and found 
that there was very little change in any of the dependent measures. The mean, median, 
standard deviation and DL over 27 participants were -57, -66, 80, and 72 msec for the 
Tone Task, and -22, -9, 83, and 69 msec for the Decide task, respectively, whereas the 
earliest reported decisions to move were about 250 msec before the movement. 
Discussion 














occurred early enough to account for Li bet's finding that the RP starts 
approximately 500 msec before the mean W. In Experiment 1, even the earliest Ws were 
still less than 200 msec before the movement, so there is no evidence of any decisions 
occurring more than 500 msec before the movement. Libet et al. (1983) and Keller and 
Heckhausen (1990) reported that cortical movement preparation for spontaneous 
movements starts about 500 msec before the movement, so all of the decisions in the 
current study were after the start of cortical movement preparation in those previous 
studies. These results therefore do not support the hypothesis that Libet et al. 's results 
could have been produced by the smearing artifact. 
Apart from the variability, the most interesting result of the present experiment is 
the difference between our mean Wand that recorded by Libet et al. (1983). Libet's 
mean was 204 msec before EMG onset (with a standard error of 12 msec), while ours 
was 16 msec before the time of the keypress (with a standard error of 12 msec). In fact, 
our W was so close to the time of the keypress at O msec that it is highly probable that 
both the mean and median W were after the start ofEMG. It is hard to say why this 
happened, especially since the value obtained in Keller and Heckhausen' s (1990) 
replication was so similar to Libet's original result. 
One possibility is that differences in experimental setup (for example, different 
hand movement, participant pool, or amount of participants' experience with the task) 
introduced a different constant error from that obtained by Libet et al. (1983). More 
specifically, it is possible that participants reported a different aspect of their experience 
than the participants in previous experiments. For example, Libet et al. found that the 






although still before EMG onset (86 msec vs. 204 msec before the EMG, 
respectively). Our reported Wis closer to Libet et al. 's M than to their W, and it is 
possible that our participants were actually reporting M rather than W. 
/ 
This raises the further question of why participants would consistently make 
40 
reports about an event different from the one they were asked about. Perhaps, as some 
critics have suggested, we really do not have conscious access to cognitive processes 
such as those underlying a spontaneous decision to move (Breitmeyer, 1985; Danto, 
1985; Rugg, 1985; Underwood &Neimi, 1985; Vanderwolf, 1985; Van Gulick, 1985; 
also see Nisbett & Wilson, 1977, for other situations in which people typically make 
mistakes in reporting their own cognitive processes). A less radical reason why 
participants might have reported M instead of W might be that they simply had not been 
trained to tell the difference. This possibility is tested in Experiment 2, where we 
compared W reports from people who had done M first with those from people who had 
not. By measuring both W and M, we also hoped to be able to clarify what participants 
in Experiment 1 had been reporting. Regardless of any questions about central tendency, 
our conclusions about the earliest onsets ofW (above) are only relevant if we can 
confirm that the W reported by our participants really reflects the time of their intention 
to move. 
Another interesting point about Win the current experiment was that its 
variability was not larger than that ofT, the reported time of a tone (see Table 1). This 
finding seems to refute suggestions (Breitmeyer, 1985; Latto, 1985; Marks, 1985) that it 
might be harder to make reports about the time of a spontaneous movement than about 








could report it at least as consistently as they could report the time of the tone. 
Like Libet et al. (1983), we found that the mean reported Twas significantly 
earlier than the actual time of the tone at O msec (-59 msec with a standard error of 15 
msec: the comparison was significant atthe level ofp<0.01, see Table 1). By 
comparison, the participants in Libet et al. reported S to be at -47 msec, relative to the 
actual time of the stimulus (with a standard error of21 msec, calculated from Libet et 
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al.' s Table 1 ). Li bet et al. argued that this error was simply due to each participant's 
characteristic "bias" in reporting the time of an event, and used it to "correct" the 
participant's W reports. Using the same procedure, our corrected mean W would be -16 
+ 59 = 43 msec after the keypress, and the distribution ofreported Ws (see Figure 4) 
would fall between -50 msec and + 120 msec. With the mean corrected W being after the 
keypress there is additional support for the suspicion discussed above: that, for whatever 
reason, our participants did not succeed in reporting the time of the intention to move, but 
rather of the movement itself 
As referred to above in our discussion of Criticisms ofLibet's Conclusions, the 
difference between reported and actual time of a sensory experience might have been 
caused by delays in the visual processing of the position of the dot, in detecting the 
feeling of initiating a movement, or in switching attention between these tasks. One 
suggestion (Rollman, 1985) is that at the beginning of the trial, the participants 
concentrate on processing the position of the dot. The processing (from the eye, via the 
optic nerve, to the visual cortex) takes time, so that the dot position available to 
consciousness (which we could designate pl) is slightly earlier than the one entering the 
eye (p3), while an intermediate position (p2) travels along the optic nerve. When the 
'( 
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person was aware of having heard the tone, the dot position committed to 
memory would be the one that had finished being processed and was currently available 
for consciousness (pl). This would account for T being earlier than the actual time of the 
tone and by analogy would also suggest that reported W was earlier than the actual event, 
as above. 
However, if participants had used as T whatever time they were conscious of at 
the time of the tone, there should be no difference between the reported Ts for faster and 
slower dots, assuming that the information processing time was the same for both dot 
speeds. The finding that T was earlier for slow dots than for fast dots seems to indicate 
that Twas obtained using a different method. For example, we could suggest that while 
the time of the tone was being processed, an intermediate dot position (p2) became 
available, and was used to estimate the time of the tone. ff p2 was adjusted by a constant 
distance, to estimate p3, the time represented by the adjustment would be larger for the 
slow dots than the fast dots, so that the slower dots would lead to earlier T reports, as 
observed. 
The idea that observation and memory of subj~ctive experiences are not 
unambiguous, but subject to reconstruction and interpretation is not a new one (see for 
example Dennett & Kinsboume, 1992) but it demonstrates the importance of being 
cautious in drawing conclusions about the processes involved in consciousness. 
In conclusion, although we have not supported the smearing-based alternative 
explanation ofLibet et al. 's (1983) results, the large difference between our mean Wand 














experiments. This conclusion is also supported by evidence of significant 
differences between the means for the different groups, who merely experienced the tasks 
and dot speeds in different orders. Alternatively, the difference might mean that our 
participants did not actually report W, in which case the smearing-based alternative 
explanation was not fairly tested. To test this alternative explanation more fairly, in 
Experiment 2 we tested participants on both Wand M tasks. This also allowed us to look 
at the effect of experience on W, by comparing participants who reported W before 
reporting M with participants who did the tasks in the opposite order. 
Experiment 2 
The average reported time of the decision to made a quick finger movement (W) 
in Experiment 1 was much closer to the time of the actual movement than expected. As 
discussed above (and suggested by Libet, personal communication) one possible reason 
for the difference is that participants did not distinguish W from the feeling that the finger 
was actually moving (referred to by Libet et al., 1983, as M). One aim of Experiment 2 
was to measure the W reported by participants who had been given the opportunity to 
differentiate between the sensations of W and M . 
In Libet et al. 's study the mean M was after the mean W, but still before the 
movement. The data from the original study (Libet et al., 1983, Table 1) show that the 20 
blocks in which participants reported M have a mean of -86 msec (with a standard error 
of 20 msec) compared to the 37 W blocks, with mean of-204 msec (12 msec). IfW was 












and M, then experience with both tasks should help participants to distinguish 
between the events, and they should therefore report W longer before the movement. 
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In addition, ifM in Experiment 2 is similar to the W obtained in Experiment 1, 
that would support the idea that participants had reported the time that the movement 
started, rather than the time of the decision to move, although an explanation of how 
participants could fail to differentiate between the events would still be required. In 
contrast, if W in Experiment 2 is similar to that recorded in Experiment 1, that would 
refute suggestions that Wis affected by experience with the M task, but also increase the 
mystery of the difference between the Win Experiment 1, and the values for W obtained 
by Libet et al. (1983) and Keller and Heckhausen (1990). 
A second possible explanation for the difference between our Wand Libet's Wis 
that participants' W reports are affected by their experience with other similar tasks. For 
example, the participants in our Experiment 1 had no experience of the difference 
between W and M tasks, while in the Libet study the two tasks were initially tested in 
alternate blocks. Libet et al. (1983) also pointed out that the means for Wand M 
depended on which of them was tested first within a single session. The means for W 
and M were -191 and -92 msec respectively when W was first, and -240 and -80 msec 
respectively when M was first, and it was reported that the interaction was at least 
marginally significant. Experiment 2 thus also tested the hypothesis that W depends on 
experience, by comparing Mand W reports from participants who performed W first with 
reports from participants who performed M first. If W does depend on experience, we 
would expect to replicate Libet et al. 's result, with W being relatively earlier (that is, 












measuring W with different participants and slightly different experimental 
conditions, we were also able to examine the robustness ofW reports across experiments. 
Method 
Par.icipants 
A total of 40 participants were obtained from the same subject pool as Experiment 
1. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
The apparatus was the same as that used in Experiment 1 except that no auditory 
stimuli were presented and thus headphones were not required. The Decision task was 
the same as in Experiment 1, with participants performing a quick finger-tap action 
whenever they felt like it within each trial. The Move task was very similar to the 
Decision task but instead of the time of the intention to move, participants were asked to 
concentrate on the feeling of the finger moving and report where the dot was at the 
beginning of the movement. To reduce the complexity of the experiment, only the Slow 
dot speed (2500 msec per revolution) was used; note that Dot Speed had no significant 
effect on the central tendency or variability of W in Experiment 1. 
Design 
Each SO-minute session contained 12 blocks, with 20 trials in each block. The 









instructions from the experimenter, and then 3 blocks of the other task. After 
another break of2 minutes, the second half consisted of three consecutive blocks of each 
task in the same order as in the first half Task order was counterbalanced across 
participants. There were equal numbers of left- and right-hand trials in each block, 
randomly intermixed. 
Results 
The times of the reference dots and the participants' temporal order judgments 
were processed to create monotonic psychometric functions, as described in Experiment 
1. 
Six of the 40 participants were excluded for having excessively large standard 
deviations, as follows. Standard deviations were calculated separately for 8 conditions 
per participant (two levels each of Task, Hand and Experiment Half). Six participants 
had two or more conditions with standard deviations that were more than two standard 
deviations above the mean standard deviation (over all 320 values) while the remaining 
participants had none, and these 6 were excluded. All of the excluded participants had 
performed the Decision task first, suggesting that this was a hard task to have begun with. 
The consequences of excluding these participants are examined below. 
The psychometric functions for the two Tasks are shown in Figure 5. Inspection 
of this figure reveals that the earliest reported decisions to move are slightly more than 
500 msec before the movement, and also suggests that there was more variability for the 









500 msec before the movement, and also suggests that there was more 
variability for the Decide Task than the Move Task. Statistical analysis confirmed this 
difference (the relevant data are shown in Table 4). 
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Figure 5. Overall psychometric functions for Experiment 2, separately for the 
Move and Decide Tasks and the two hands, pooled across the 34 participants 








The main results from Experiment 2, with details in the text (n=34). Notes: all the times 
are in msec relative to the time of the keypress. Negative times are before the keypress. 
































We compared the central tendencies of the two groups using ANOV As on mean 
and median, with factors of Task (Move vs. Decide), Task Order (Move-first vs. Decide-













The variability was analysed with similar ANOV As, on the standard deviation 
and DL. The results are shown in Table 4 . 
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As in Experiment 1, we present only results where both the related dependent 
measures (mean and median, or standard deviation and DL) were significant, and only 
two comparisons in Experiment 2 met this criterion. One was the result that variability 
was greater for the Decide task ( on average across Hand, Task Order and amount of 
Practice) than for the Move task (ps for SD and DL both <0.05: all comparisons in this 
study have degrees of freedom 1 and 32). There was also a Hand by Task interaction on 
central tendencies, which indicated that the amount that reports about the right hand were 
earlier than those about the left hand was greater for the Move task than the Decide task 
(for the means p<0.10, while for the medians, p<0.05). 
Effect of Experience 
The evidence that experience with the M task has an effect on the time of 
participants' W reports was suggestive rather than conclusive. The ANOV As described 
above (performed on the means, medians, standard deviations and DLs) showed that the 
difference between the Move-first and Decide-first groups was only marginally 
significant for the means (p<O .1 ), and not at all for the medians (p>O .1 ). 
Numerically, the results indicate that like Libet etal. (1983), we found that W was 
further before the movement when the Move Task was first, relative to when the Decide 
Task was first. For the Move-first group, W was considerably earlier than M (means -














respectively) while for the Decide-first group the difference between the Tasks 
was in the opposite direction, but smaller (means -66 vs. -76 msec, and medians -90 vs. 
-85 msec, for Decide and Move tasks respectively). However, as stated above, these 
differences were not reliable enough to reach significance. 
Excluded Participants 
As in Experiment 1 our estimates of variability were conservative, because we 
excluded six participants who had variability that was much greater than that of the other 
participants. However the proportion of variable participants was higher than expected 
(6/40), and raises the question of whether we can exclude so many participants without 
unfairly biasing the data. For comparison therefore, we repeated the main analysis with 
these participants included ( collapsing across the Task Order factor, which had unequal 
group sizes). In contrast to Experiment 1, including these participants made a 
considerable difference to our results when included. The central tendencies of the 
distributions were not much affected, with means of-57 and-89 msec (-73 and-85 msec) 
and medians of-98 and -127 msec (-79 and-97 msec) for Move and Decide tasks 
respectively for n=40 ( comparison values from Table 4 with n = 34 are shown in 
brackets). However, the measurements of variability were hugely inflated, with standard 
deviations of213 and 234 msec (91 and 114 msec) and DLs of208 and 223 msec (83 and 
107 msec) for Move and Decide tasks, respectively for n=40 (and n=34). More 
importantly to our central concern, when the data from all 40 participants was pooled 
together (see Figure 6) the earliest reported decisions to move were more than 1300 msec 












start of the Readiness Potential, this would imply that the decision may be 













'--" d: 0.3 
0.2 
• - Move Left Hand 
"' -- Move Right Hand 
- -· __ .-· _ ~ o · · · Decide Left Hand 
0. 1 t ~ A - - - Decide Right hand j 
0.0 i......::==-~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~ 
-1500 -1000 -500 0 500 1000 1500 2000 
Time 
51 
Figure 6. Overall psychometric functions from Experiment 2, pooled across 
all 40 participants, separately for the Move and Decide tasks and the two hands . 
Note that the earliest reported decision to move is more than 1300 msec before the 
movement at O msec. 
Comparison Across Experiments 1 & 2 
To look at the differences between experiments, two-tailed t-tests were performed 
to compare the W from Experiment 1 (-16 msec with a standard errot of 12 msec) with 
the W (-85 (20) msec) and M (-73 (19) msec), from Experiment 2. These t-tests ~howed 
















Experiment 2, with ts of 2. 98 and 2. 85 respectively (ps<O.01 ). 
Discussion 
The main purpose of the second experiment was to gather more evidence about 
the earliest reported times of a decision to move, and with 34 participants the earliest 
reported decisions were slightly more than 500 msec before the movement. This time is 
very close to the RP onset reported by Libet et al. (1983), so we cannot rule out the 
possibility that these decisions were before the start of the RP. However, this cross-study 
comparison is fairly crude, and it would clearly be preferable to compare decision-times 
and brain activity data that were measured within the same trials. 
Moreover, when all 40 participants were included in the analysis, the earliest 
reported decisions to move were more than 1300 msec before the movement. These early 
decisions were well before the time that Libet et al. (1983) and Keller and Heckhausen 
(1990) reported as the start of the RP, and they clearly support the smearing-based 
alternative explanation of Li bet et al.' s results. However, the issue of excluded 
participants is a difficult one. One consideration is that Libet et al. did not leave out any 
participants because of high variability, so it is possible that some of their 6 participants 
could have had similarly high variability of W reports, in which case the most appropriate 
comparison would be with all 40 participants. Without knowing whether or not Libet et 
al. 's data includes any of these highly variable participants, it is hard to tell whether a 
more realistic comparison is obtained by including or excluding these 6 participants, but 














Experiment 2 was also concerned with evaluating the possibility that the 
reason why Win the first experiment was so close to the time of the movement was that 
participants reported the sensation of actually moving (M), rather than of deciding to 
move (W). The evidence does not strongly support this idea, since both Mand W in 
Experiment 2 were significantly different from (and longer before the movement than) 
the W reported in Experiment 1. On the other hand, participants in Experiment 2 did not 
differentiate between M and W ( on average across groups) even though they had 
experience at both tasks. It therefore seems likely that the participants in Experiment 1 
also failed to distinguish between the sensations, but that would not account for their 
mean W being different from both mean Wand M in the second experiment. 
Like Libet et al. (1983), we found that the difference between Mand W was 
larger when M was tested first in a particular session; this finding supports the conclusion 
that reports about W are labile and affected by experimental context. 
Conclusions over Experiments 1 and 2 
The purpose of these two studies was to test an alternative explanation of Li bet et 
al. 's results, which seemed to show that movement-related brain activity starts before the 
person concerned has consciously decided to move. As outlined in Chapter 1, if the 
earliest decisions were before the earliest RP onsets, then a smearing artifact associated 























RP on every trial, even given Li bet et al.' s results. The two studies tested this 
explanation by using TOJ methods to look at the times of the earliest decisions. The 
results showed that there was some support for the explanation in the second study (but 
not in the first), with the earliest decisions at about the same time as the RP onset which 
had been reported by Libet et al. In addition, some participants in Experiment 2 reported 
decisions up to 1300 msec before the movement, but these participants' variability was so 
large that it is difficult to how much weight to give to their reports. Overall, we conclude 
that the smearing-based explanation has not yet been ruled out, but that it would be 
preferable to compare participants' reported decision times and cortical movement 
preparation within the same study. 
The alternative explanation considered here was supported by results of the 
second experiment, but not the first. However, as noted in the discussion of Experiment 
1, our conclusions about the earliest decisions to move are only valid if our W 
successfully measured the time of the intention to move, and this may not have been the 
case, since our values for mean W differ both from each other and from those obtained 
previously. Libet et al. 's (1983) average W for spontaneous movements was -204 (12) 
msec, and this was closely approximated by Keller and Heckhausen's (1990) replication, 
with an average W of-205 (23) msec. The current Experiments 1 and 2 had Ws of-16 
(12) msec and -85 (20) msec respectively, and these means were significantly different 
from each other. 
The difference between studies is hard to explain, but it seems reasonable to 
suggest that both the variability ofW and its central tendency are affected by subtle 

























conjunction with a Tone Task or a Move Task (as in the comparison between 
Ws of Experiments 1 & 2), but it was also affected by the order in which the tasks were 
performed (as in the significant Task Order by Dot Speed Order interaction in 
Experiment 1). Gomes (1998) was surprised that Libet et al.'s (1983) study has not been 
more widely replicated, and the large difference between mean Ws in the present and 


















This chapter describes two experiments in which we compared participants' 
movement-related brain activity with the reported times of either their decisions to move 
or their decisions of which hand to move. Although the Readiness Potential was usually 
present before all of the decisions to move (consistent with the findings of Keller & 
Heckhausen, 1990 and Li bet, Gleason, Wright & Pearl, 1983), we found that many of the 
reported decision-times were before the onset of the Lateralised Readiness Potential 
(which measures hand-specific movement preparation). This finding is consistent with 
the conclusion that in every trial the LRP always started after the conscious decision to 
move. We conclude that even though activity related to movement anticipation may be 
present long before a movement occurs, the cortical preparation necessary for the 
movement to happen immediately may not start until after the conscious decision to 
move. 
How does a person voluntarily initiate a movement? One explanation 
(formalised by Descartes (trans. 1988) but so widely taken for granted that it seems 
obvious) is that the person freely makes a conscious decision to move, which initiates the 
required type of brain activity and consequently the movement itself. However in their 
1983 paper Libet, Gleason, Wright and Pearl presented evidence suggesting that the 
decision to make a voluntary movement actually occurs after the onset of movement 
preparation in the brain. In the Libet paradigm (which is described in the previous 























movement they were asked to identify the time of the decision to initiate that 
movement. At the same time, scalp electrodes were used to record the Readiness 
Potential (RP: a measurement of cortical movement preparation) from the participants. 
Libet et al. found that the average onset of the RP was 500 msec before the movement, 
while the average reported decision time was only 200 msec before the movement. They 
concluded that brain preparation starts before the reported time of a conscious decision 
to move, and hence that movement initiation begins unconsciously. As discussed in 
Chapter 1, these results were quite controversial, since they are open to other 
interpretations, and seem to contradict the idea that our conscious decisions have a causal 
effect on our actions . 
In the preceding chapters, we presented and tested an alternative explanation for 
Li bet et al.' s (1983) results. The explanation was based on the finding that the latency of 
an EEG component (such as the RP) differs, depending on whether latencies are derived 
from each individual trial and averaged, or one latency measurement is taken from an 
average over all trials (Callaway, Halliday, Naylor & Thouvenin, 1984). The difference 
is caused by a smearing artifact which means that the latency of a component in an 
averaged wave-form depends on the earliest latency of the component in all the trials that 
make up the average (Meyer, Osman, Irwin & Yantis, 1988). In other words, Li bet et 
al.' s RP onset times of about -500 msec could still have occurred even if in most trials the 
RP started much closer to the movement, as long as there were a few trials with onsets of 
about -500 msec. 
Previous studies (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Li bet et al., 1983) did not report 



























described in the previous chapter. In these studies, we recorded participants' 
reported decision times and used temporal-order judgement (TOJ) methodology to look 
at the whole distribution of these times, and in particular to identify the earliest reported 
times. In the first study described in the previous chapter, none of the reported decision 
times were more than 300 msec before the movement, but the second study produced 
evidence that some decisions were as early as 500 msec before the movement. These 
earlier decisions may well have been before the time of RP onset (which was also at 
about -500 msec; Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983). The difference 
between the earliest reported decisions and the RP onsets obtained in these previous 
studies was small, and we clearly needed to compare decision-times and brain activity 
within the same experiment. The two studies reported in the current chapter were 
performed to fulfil this requirement, and they will be described after a brief description of 
the types of cortical activity that usually precede a voluntary movement. 
Another possible problem with Libet' s conclusion is that the PR may not measure 
only the decision to move but also general readiness. A second goal of this thesis, then, 
was to assess the timing of the LRP - a more clearly decision-related component-
compared to the reported times of decisions to move. 
The Movement-related Corneal Potential 
The changes that occur in the brain before and after a self-paced voluntary 






















The MRCP can be obtained non-invasively by attaching electrodes to the scalps 
of human volunteers, measuring brain activity during a number ofmovements8 and then 
averaging activity across the trials, with the recordings aligned at the time of the 
movement9. The most visible component of the MRCP is the Readiness Potential (RP) 
because of its relatively large amplitude and long duration, and this was the component 
measured by Libet et al (1983). In the present studies, we will also look at the 
8 The movements referred to in the present paper are usually made by the hand or 
wrist. Hand movements have been frequently used for investigations of the RP, because 
they produce large, consistent RPs (Shibasaki, 1992) and are convenient to study 
experimentally. 
9 In any single trial, the RP is obscured by the "noise" of other activity within the 
brain. When several trials are averaged together ( with the EEG recordings aligned at the 
same point), the fluctuations that are not related to the movement tend to average out, so 
that the RP and other components can be distinguished. The method used to align the 
EEG recordings of each trial varies across studies. Many studies have used the start of 
muscle activity in the moving arm (Benecke et al., 1985; Deecke etal., 1976; Karp, 
Porter, Toro & Hallett, 1996; Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983; Papa, 
Artieda, & Obeso, 1991 ), or peak EMG (Shibasaki, Barrett, Halliday & Halliday, 1980), 
while other studies align trials using the time of some observable external event, such as 
pushing a key on a computer keyboard (Miller & Ulrich, 1998; this method was also used 























Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP), which measures hand-specific preparation to 
move10 . 
The Readiness Potential 
The earliest component of the MRCP is the Readiness Potential (RP, which has 
also been referred to as the Bereitschaftspotential by Kornhuber & Deecke, 1964; Deecke 
et al., 1976, and as Nl by Vaughan et al., 1968). The RP is a slow negative wave that 
precedes a voluntary movement, and as its name suggests it probably reflects processes 
involved in planning or intending to move in the near future (Shibasaki, 1992). When the 
movements are performed in long irregular sequences, the averaged RP begins up to 1-1. 5 
seconds before the movement (see Figure 7 for a schematic diagram), although with more 
practice the onset becomes closer to the time of the movement (Deecke et al., 1976). 
10 There are also several other components of the :MRCP wrJch are not relevant to 
Libet et al.' s claim, since they occur much closer to the time of the movement or even 
after it. These components have been reported under various overlapping names, 
including the PMP and MP (identified by Deecke, Grozinger & Kornhuber, 1976), the Pl 
and N2 (described by Vaughan, Costa & Ritter, 1968), the P-50 and the N-10 (Shibasaki, 
Barrett, Halliday, & Halliday, 1980). The components of the large positive complex that 
follows a movement (Deecke et al., 1976) are also unlikely to precede the decision to 
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Figure 7, with idealised MRCPs before a left-hand movement, recorded from the 
vertex (Cz), and from above the left (C3') and right (C4') primary motor cortex. 
The first component (from -1500 to -400 msec before the movement at O msec) is the 
slow negative wave, the RP. The component starting at about-400 msec relative to 
the movement is the NS', which has a steeper negative slope contralateral to the 
moving hand (C4', in the right hemisphere) than ipsilaterally (at C3'). The lowest 
line shows the LRP, the difference between activity in the contralateral and 
ipsilateral motor cortices (that is, C3' - C4'). 
The RP occurs in the precentral and parietal cortex areas (it is sometimes positive' 
ifrecorded from the frontal cortex; Deecke et al., 1976), and the maximum amplitude of 

























the hemispheres for movements by either hand, and it is probably generated at 
least partly in the supplementary motor area (the SMA; Barrett, Shibasaki & Neshige, 
1986; Shibasaki 1992). 
62 
The onset time of the RP varies across people and across tasks even for the same 
person, but it is consistent for a given person performing the same task across time 
(Vaughan et al., 1968). However because the RP begins gradually, and because the EEG 
signal contains random noise, it is difficult to unequivocally determine the onset time 
(Van Der Kamp, Rothwell, Thompson, Day & Marsden, 1995). The issue of measuring 
onset latencies of MRCP components and latency differences between any two 
conditions is discussed further below . 
The RP is affected by many of the characteristics of the movement it precedes 
such as the degree of complexity, and it also seems to depend on whether the person 
moving was conscious of intending to move. For example, the RP is larger before two 
movements performed in sequence or simultaneously, relative to either movement 
performed alone (Benecke etaL, 1985). There is also evidence thatRPs are of larger 
amplitude before deliberate voluntary movements than before unconscious movements 
(Keller & Heckhausen, 1990) or before the involuntary tics associated with Gilles de la 
Tourette's syndrome (Obeso, Rothwell, & Marsden, 1981, but compare Karp, Porter, 
Toro, & Hallett, 1996) . 
The latency and amplitude of the RP also depend on whether the movement is 
initiated internally (by the person making the movement) or externally, such as a 


















that a normal RP of about 1300 msec preceded voluntary (internally initiated) 
movements, but that there was no RP before the same movement performed in response 
to an imperative stimulus in a reaction-time paradigm, even if the participant knew in 
advance which movement would be required. When the participant was asked to wait for 
some (self-determined) brief time after the imperative stimulus before moving the usual 
RP was produced: a slow negative wave was also recorded when the warning signal was 
followed after some interval by a movement-triggering stimulus. Papa et al. concluded 
that the RP reflects a sequence of processes necessary for a voluntary movement to be 
generated, and that some of these processes (such as those responsible for the timing of 
the movement) can be omitted from the sequence when the movement is generated in 
response to a stimulus. 
Although the RP reflects cortical activity related to the preparation to move it may 
not be related specifically to motor preparation, but is probably caused at least partly by 
cognitive or perceptual aspects of the preparation to move, such as anticipation or 
motivation. For example, the RP before a movement is larger when the participant 
expects to receive feedback about the results of the movement (McCallum, 1988), and it 
almost completely disappears as participants lose interest in the task (Deecke, Becker, 
Grozinger, Scheid & Kornhuber, 1973). Moreover, the RP is very similar to the slow 
negative wave which occurs in the foreperiod between a warning stimulus and an 
imperative "go" signal, known as the contingent negative variation (CNV'). Apart from 
the fact that the RP and the CNV precede internally-cued and warned externally-cued 
movements respectively, there seems to be "no fundamental difference" between them 



















may be observed in anticipation of a stimulus as well as a motor response . 
Thus, although the RP has been reported 500 msec before a spontaneous 
voluntary movement (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983), the onset time of 
motor-specific preparation is still not clear. 
TheLRP 
To identify activity that is more specific to motor preparation than the RP, it was 
suggested that researchers needed to look for a component with an asymmetry that 
depended on which hand was about to move (Kutas & Donchin, 1980). Because each 
half of the body is controlled by the motor cortex on the opposite side of the brain (for 
most right-handed people), it was argued that this asymmetry might reasonably taken to 
reflect movement-specific processes. 
Such a pattern of asymmetry occurs in the MRCP about 400-500 msec before a 
movement, with greater negativity in the hemisphere opposite the moving hand (Deecke 
et al., 1976; Shibasaki et al., 1980), and with the slope of the MRCP becoming steeper 
(Vaughan et al., 1968). This asymmetric component of the MRCP is referred to as the 
NS', and its maximum is in the precentral primary motor cortex (Vaughan et al.). The 
NS' seems to represent a lateralised increase in activity in the primary motor cortex 
which will control the forthcoming movement (Barrett et al., 1986; Shibasaki et al., 
1980).11 In response to Kutas and Donchin's (1980) suggestion, two groups 























independently derived the Lateralised Readiness Potential (LRP; Coles, Gratton 
& Donchin, 1988; de Jong, Wierda, Mulder & Mulder, 1988) which measures the 
difference between NS' component in the motor cortex controlling the movement and the 
NS' in the motor cortex of the opposite hemisphere. 
The formula for calculating the LRP is shown below. Essentially, the difference 
between activity recorded near the primary motor cortex ipsilateral to the movement and 
the amount of contralateral activity is calculated. The difference between hemispheres is 
then averaged across movements by left and right hands to exclude any overall difference 
in hemispheric activity (see Figure 8). In the formula, C3' and C4' are unfiltered 
recordings from the precentral cortices of the left and right hemisphere, and land r refer 
to movements made by the left and right hands respectively. 
LRP = [(C3'1 - C4'1) + (C4'r- C3' r)] I 2 
roughly -900 msec, between the RP (-1600 msec) and the NS' (-300 msec) but the 
significance of this component has yet to be determined. The IS was symmetrical before 
a left-hand movement and asymmetric (with greater negativity contralateral to the 
moving hand) before a right-hand movement, and it was probably generated in the 
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recorded from above the left (C3') and right (C4') primary motor cortex 
prior to a left-hand movement. Note that the motor cortex contralateral to the 
moving hand (C4', in the right hemisphere) is more negative than the ipsilateral 
cortex (C3'). In the centre left figure, the difference between contralateral and 
ipsilateral EEG activity is shown for this left-hand movement. The figures on the 
right demonstrate the corresponding patterns of activity expected before a right-
hand movement, again with the hemisphere contralateral to the movement (C3') 
being more negative than the ipsilateral recording (C4') in the top figure. The 
centre right figure again shows the difference between contralateral and ipsilateral 
activity for a right-hand movement. The lowest figure shows the LRP, which is 
calculated by averaging the differences shown, over left- and right-hand movements. 
The LRP has several characteristics that indicate it may be a useful measure of 
hand-specific movement preparation (see Miller & Hackley, 1992). The most basic of 
these is that the onset of the LRP is before the start of the movement, so that the claim 
has initial credibility. In addition, as mentioned above the LRP is maximal over the 
primary motor cortex of each hemisphere (Vaughan et al., 1968), and is at least partly 
generated in that area. Additional evidence for the involvement of primary motor cortex 
in the LRP comes from the finding that the polarity of the LRP for foot movements is 
opposite to that for hand movements (Brunia & Vingerhoets, 1980). This can be 
explained by the fact that while hand movements are mapped onto an area on the outside 
surface of the motor cortex, foot movements are represented in an area which is curled 
over inside the longitudinal fissure of the brain. Thus, when the surface negativity 



































activity point in opposite directions. Miller and Hackley (1992) argue that in 
other sections of the brain (such as the premotor cortex, SMA or cerebellum) the 
relationships between areas that map to the hands and feet do not give rise to similar 
explanations for opposite polarity. As well as being sensitive to whether a movement is 
made by a hand or a foot, the LRP is also affected by the complexity of a movement 
(Hackley & Miller, 1995). Other aspects, such as the degree of force planned for the 
movement, have no effect (Kutas & Donchin, 1977). 
An important feature of the LRP is that it is very sensitive to whether or not there 
is an opportunity to prepare for the movement. For example, when a cue provides 
information about which hand will be required to make a response to an imperative 
stimulus, an LRP is generated in the period before that stimulus (Gratton, Bosco, Kramer, 
Coles, Wickens, & Donchin, 1990). As would be expected, the polarity of the LRP 
generated in this condition indicates that the amount of cortical activity is greater in the 
hemisphere opposite the cued hand. The LRP can also occur when the moving hand has 
been specified, before the subject has been told which finger to move ( de Jong et al., 
1988), and when an imperative stimulus is later contradicted by an instruction not to 
move (de Jong, Coles, Logan, & Gratton, 1990) 
In summary, the RP seems to reflect the general anticipation of a forthcoming 
voluntary movement or other event, while the LRP is more specific to motor preparation 
and measures the degree to which there is more preparation to move one hand than the 
other. 


















In the early studies of the MRCP, the movements studied were 
voluntary self-paced flexes of the hand or fingers, which the participant repeated at 
irregular intervals of 3-4 seconds (Barrett et al. 1986; Shibasaki et al., 1980). The 
69 
movements were described as voluntary because they were not responses to an external 
stimulus, and as self-paced because the participant determined the time of each flex. 
However, it was argued that such repetitive self-paced movements were not spontaneous 
enough to be truly voluntary (Libet, Wright, & Gleason, 1982). In order to promote 
spontaneity in the Li bet et al. (1983) study, participants were allowed to wait as long as 
they wanted to before moving and there was only one movement in each trial, so that 
each was produced separately (rather than as part of a series). These movements were 
described as self-initiated. 
Initially, participants still produced RPs that started about one second before the 
self-initiated movements. Later, participants were given instructions to "let the urge to 
act appear on its own ... without any preplanning" (Li bet et al., 1983, p 625), that is, to 
move as soon as they wanted to, rather than planning ahead when the movement would 
happen. The brain activity before these more spontaneous movements started later, an 
average of 500-600 msec before the EMG onset (Libet et al., 1983). Although the 
negativity was referred to as a Readiness Potential, the onset time was so close to the 
movement that it is possible that much of the activity was the NS' rather than the earlier 
RP component, especially since the shorter MRCP was asymmetric and had more 
negativity in the hemisphere contralateral to the movement (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; 
Libet et al., 1982). 
























participant in the Libet et al. (1983) study admitted that he or she had planned 
in advance when one or more of the movements (from a block of 40 trials) would happen. 
In these cases (12 out of the 37 blocks) the MRCP usually began earlier- an average of 
about one second before the movement. This evidence supports the suggestion that the 
RP is present far in advance of the movement when some degree of preplanning occurs, 
but that the RP is much shorter or perhaps even omitted when a movement is completely 
spontaneous. Taken as a whole, these results further support the idea that the RP 
indicates that the participant is considering a movement that will occur at some time in 
the future, while the LRP (which is derived from the asymmetric NS') reflects brain 
activity involved in moving immediately12. 
Experiment 3 
Li bet et al.' s (1983) results suggest that the average time of the decision to move 
is after the start of the RP. In the Chapter 1 we pointed out that because of a smearing 
artifact, the onset time of the averaged RP reflects the earliest RP onset times of the trials 
12 At the other extreme, Li bet et al. (1983) reported that brain activity during some 
other blocks started very shortly before the time of the movement. Out of the 37 blocks 
that were reported, the 5 shortest MRCPs had an average onset of just -270 msec before 
the movement. These blocks rarely occurred in the first session for any participant, and 
given the evidence (Deecke et al. 1973) that RP declines with participants' motivation, it 

























that make up the average, rather than the most typical onset times. In Chapter 2 
we showed that because of this artifact, it is possible that Li bet et al.' s results could have 
been obtained even if the RP onset was after the decision time on each individual trial. 
One purpose of the third experiment was to evaluate further the possibility that 
there were any decisions reported before the start of movement preparation, as identified 
by the RP. If there were, it is possible that reported decision times are always before RP 
onset on each trial, despite Libet et al.'s (1983) averaged results. In the previous chapter, 
the results suggested that the earliest decisions were up to about 500 msec before the 
movement. This is approximately the same time as the onset of the RP (Keller & 
Heckhausen, Li bet et al., 1983 ). In the current experiments we extend the previous 
studies by comparing brain activity and reported decision-times from the same trials. As 
in Chapter 2, we identified the earliest reported decisions by collating participants' 
reports to create a psychometric function of the distribution of their reported decision-
times (W). Movement preparation was measured using both the RP (for comparison with 
previous studies) and the LRP (an index of hand-specific movement preparation). 
The second goal of this study was based on the distinction between the RP and the 
LRP. As argued above, there is evidence that the LRP is more specific to the initiation of 
an immediate movement than the RP. For this reason, as well as attempting to replicate 
Li bet et al.' s (1983) results about the relationship between the reported times of 
conscious decision to move and the RP, we also looked at the relationship between 



























A total of 19 volunteers, recruited from the University ofOtago campus, were 
each paid $30 to participate in a single 3-hour session. All participants were right handed 
according to the Edinburgh Handedness Inventory and had normal or corrected to normal 
VIS10n . 
Apparatus 
A computer was used to present the instructions and stimuli for each trial (via a 
standard colour computer monitor) and to collect the participants' responses, which were 
made by pressing one of two keys on a standard computer keyboard. The apparatus for 
the collection of EEG data is described below. 
Procedure 
The Task. The procedure was similar to that used by Libet et al. (1983). In each 
trial the participant sat watching the computer monitor, with fingers resting lightly on the 
keyboard. At the beginning of each trial a blue Lor R appeared in the centre of the 
screen, to indicate whether the participant should move with the left hand (to press the 
"z" key) or right hand (to press the slash key,"/") on that trial. The letter was visible for 
1 second and then there was a delay (uniformly distributed between 1-2 seconds) before 






















seconds in each trial. The participant was asked to watch the clock and to 
suddenly press the appropriate key any time they wanted to, noting the position of the dot 
at the time of the decision to "go now". The procedure used for the participants to report 
the time of their decision to move is described below. As in the Libet et al. study 
participants were encouraged to move spontaneously, as soon as they felt like it, rather 
than preplanning the movement. 
The Clock. Just as in the studies reported in the previous chapter, the clock was a 
blue rectangular track, 15 mm wide and 110 mm tall, with equally spaced ticks labelled 
from 1-12 around the perimeter. The fixation dot in the centre of the clock was white, as 
was the dot that moved at a constant speed (of 0.1 m/sec) around the track. The moving 
dot made just over 3.25 clockwise revolutions per 8-second trial if no key-press was 
made. 
If the participant did press a key, the dot continued moving for 500-800 msec 
(uniformly distributed) and then appeared somewhere on the track as a stationary 
reference dot (see below for details of how the reference position of the dot was 
determined for each trial). The continued movement of the dot was to prevent the 
participants from using the disappearance of the dot as a visual cue for the time of the 
key-press. The participant was then asked to report the time of the decision to move in 
that trial. 
Reporting the time of the decision to move. The reporting procedure for the time 
of the decision to move has been described in a previous chapter, and was similar to the 
Order Method ofLibet et al. (1983). Briefly, once the reference dot had appeared at 
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some point on the clock, the participant was asked to indicate either that the 
decision to move was before the time represented by the dot [z key] or that the decision 
was after the reference dot [ slash key]. The participant was also prompted to report 
whether the timing of the movement in that trial had been spontaneous [z key] or 
preplanned [slash key]. 
As in the experiments described previously, the position of the stationary 
reference dot on each trial was determined using Kaembach's (1991) weighted up-and-
down method, with two randomly interleaved staircases. To estimate the 75th percentile 
(the time that was reported as being before the decision 75% of the time), the dot initially 
appeared at the location where the travelling dot had been 400 msec before the key-press. 
In subsequent trials the dot was moved either 10 msec later (relative to its previous 
position) if the participant reported that the reference dot was before the decision to 
move, or 30 msec earlier if the participant said the dot was after the decision. Similarly, 
for the 25th percentile series (to find the time that was only before the decision on 25% of 
trials) the reference dot initially appeared at the location where the travelling dot had 
been at the instant of the key-press, and the location of this dot was adjusted either 30 
msec later or 10 msec earlier, depending on the participants' reports. It should be noted 
that time is again reported relative to when the key was pressed by the participant. 
Design. The experiment consisted of 12 blocks of 20 trials. There were equal 
numbers ofleft and right hand trials randomly intermixed in each block. Participants 
were allowed to wait as long as they wanted to before initiating each new block, and 
there was also a compulsory 5-minute break after the first 6 blocks. The experimental 
























The scalp electrodes (Ag/AgCl) were attached using Grass EC2 electrode cream 
at positions C3 ', Cz, and C4 ', where Cz is the vertex and C3' and C4' are 1 cm anterior 
and superior to C3 and C4 respectively, using the International 10/20 System. Self-
adhesive facial electrodes were attached above and below the left eye to record blinks and 
vertical eye movements; near the left and right outer canthi to detect horizontal eye 
movements, and in the centre of the forehead to act as a ground electrode. Vertical eye 
movements were recorded as the difference between the electrodes above and below the 
left eye. For all other head measurements, the reference was a butterfly electrode fixed to 
the left earlobe with EC2 cream. The electromyogram (EMG) for each arm was recorded 
as the difference between two self-adhesive electrodes, placed 1/3 and 2/3 of the distance 
between wrist and elbow on the left and right inner forearms. 
Impedances for the scalp and face electrodes were less than 5 kQ, while the arm 
electrodes had impedances less than 15 kQ. Signals from the electrodes were amplified 
using an amplifier made by SA Instrumentation Co. of San Diego, with bandpass settings 
of 0.01-100 Hz for scalp and horizontal eye movement electrodes, and of0.1-100 Hz for 
arm and vertical eye movement electrodes. The electrophysiological data were sampled 
at 100 Hz and converted to digital information to be stored on computer for off-line 
analysis. The 200 msec before the appearance of the clock on each trial was used as the 
baseline. 























An obvious way to statistically compare the onset latencies of a 
component across conditions is to determine the latency of the component for each 
individual, and use the variation between participants to estimate the error of the mean 
difference. However, it has recently been shown that in some situations better results can 
be obtained when variation is estimated using a procedure called jackknifing (Miller, 
Patterson & Ulrich, 1998). Briefly, jackknifing involves averaging the wave-forms to be 
tested over groups of all but one of the experimental participants (leaving out each 
participant in tum) and scoring the onset latencies from the averaged wave-forms using 
some criterion (Miller et al. 1998). The variation between the latencies of the different 
averages is used to estimate the amount of error in the mean latency of each condition, 
and thus to test the significance of the difference between the means of two conditions. 
Miller et al. (1998) found that good estimates of LRP onset latency differences 
were obtained when the criteria for onset were quite high (50 to 90% of the maximum 
amplitude of the wave-form). Although the latencies to the criteria are later than the 
actual start of the components, they can be assumed to be later by the same amount for 
both conditions, as long as the wave-forms are the same shape, so that the difference 
between them can still be tested for significance. We used jackknifing to test for latency 
differences between conditions in the current study. 
Results 
Preliminary EEG analysis 
























participant, the first block was considered practice and was not analysed. Trials 
with no responses (1.3 % ), or with responses by the wrong hand (3 .2%) were also 
discarded, as were trials in which the participant reported that the movement had been 
preplanned (4.5%: there were not enough preplanned trials to analyse these separately). 
We also excluded all trials in which the movement was made in the first 1000 msec of the 
trial, because we were interested in the brain activity which occurred up to 2 seconds 
before a movement. On average across the 19 participants 15% of trials were discarded 
for early responses, but for one participant 71 % of trials had to be thrown out, so this 
participant's data were not included in the analyses. 
Inspection of EMG data revealed that two participants had large slow 
disturbances in one or both arm channels throughout much of the experiment, possibly 
indicating either continuous movements or tension in the arm muscles. Because such 
lateralised movement would be likely to contaminate the LRP, these participants were 
excluded from the analysis. Another participant had a lot of high frequency noise on all 
EEG channels (possibly caused by insecure connections between the electrodes and the 
scalp) and was also excluded, as was a participant with atypical temporal-order 
judgement data (see TOJ Results for details). 
For the remaining 14 participants, trials containing artifacts (such as horizontal 
eye movements, transient tension in the arm muscles, and amplifier problems in the 2000 
msec before the movement) were excluded. The average number of trials actually used 















The effects of blinks and horizontal eye movements were eliminated 
from scalp EEGs with an eye-movement correction procedure (EMCP; Gratton, Coles & 
Donchin, 1983). This procedure works by using linear regression to determine how 
much of the EEG data can be predicted from eye activity, and then subtracting this 
component from the EEG data to correct for the influence of eye movements. The 
recording from each channel was then time-locked to the key-press, averaged across 
trials, and baselined. The 200 msec between 2400 and 2200 msec before the keypress 
was used as a baseline period, to avoid contaminating the waves with the small amount of 
lateralisation that occurred immediately after the hand cue and persisted until the 
movement. We then examined the RP and LRP as described below. The waveforms 
shown in the figures, from which the mean amplitudes for analysis of variance were 
measured, are unfiltered. 
Electrophysiological Results 
The RP. To look at the RP, the activity at Cz was averaged over the left- and 
right-hand movements of the 14 participants and the resulting wave is shown in Figure 9. 
As discussed above previous studies estimated RP onset by eye, and visually the main 
negative shift seems to begin about 1500 msec before the movement. However 
significance tests showed that the negativity of the RP did not approach reliability until 
1100 msec before the movement. This long onset time is similar to those reported prior 
to preplanned (as opposed to spontaneous) movements (Libet et al., 1982), and is 
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Figure 9, showing Cz activity before a voluntary fmger movement from Experiment 
3, on average over all trials from 14 participants. The key-press is shown at O msec, 
and the RP seems to begin about 1500 msec before the keypress. 
To test the significance of the RP, we measured the mean amplitude of unfiltered 
Cz activity from each participant in 50-msec epochs, from -1500 msec to+ 100 msec: 
these times refer to the start of the epoch and are relative to the key-press at O msec. For 
each epoch, a two-tailed t-test (with n = 14, df= 13) was performed. These showed that 
the activity at Cz was at least marginally negative ( with p<0.1) during the epochs starting 
at-1100, -1050 and-1000 msec, and from-900 to -200 msec. Of these epochs, the ones 
starting at-800, and -400 to -250 msec were significant at the p<0.05 level. Cz was also 


























The onset time of -1100 msec was much earlier than the -500 msec 
reported previously for an RP before a spontaneous voluntary movement (Keller & 
Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983). The results are not directly comparable because 
the method of establishing onset time differed across studies, but significance testing 
gives a conservative (late) value, and if the onset time of the present experiment had been 
determined visually (as in Libet et al., 1983), it would have been even earlier, and the 
difference even greater. 
The LRP. The LRP was calculated separately for each participant according to 
the methods described above. The average LRP over all participants is shown in Figure 
10, and it suggests that there is hand-specific movement preparation from about 300 msec 
before the movement. To test the significance of the LRP, we measured the mean 
amplitude of the unfiltered LRP in epochs of 50 msec from -1000 msec to + 100 msec 
relative to the key-press, for each participant. Two-tailed t-tests (n = 14, df= 13) 
confirmed that the mean amplitude of the LRP was marginally greater than zero during 
the epoch starting at -250 msec (p<O. l ), and significantly positive from -200 msec until 
+ 100 msec (p<0.05). Thus, the LRP results suggest that hand-specific cortical movement 
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Figure 10, showing the LRP from Experiment 3, calculated as described in the text 
(n=14). 
TOJ Results 
As in the studies described previously, psychometric functions were derived from 
the temporal order judgements of all participants, separately for the left- and right-hand 
movements of each participant. These functions measured the probability (for each point 
in time, relative to the key-press) that the person would report that the decision to move 
had happened before the dot, when the dot appeared at that time. The psychometric 
functions went from 0% for times well before the key-press to 100% when the dot 
appeared well after the movement, and were manipulated to be monotonic (using the 
Spearman-Karber method, see Ulrich, 1987). 
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function was calculated as described below, and the mean, median, standard 
deviation (SD) and difference threshold (DL) were obtained, separately for each hand. 
Two of the 30 standard deviations were more than 3 standard deviations from the group 
average, and the participant to whom both of these values belonged was excluded from 
the data analysis. 
The distributions of the 14 acceptable participants' reports aboutthe times of their 
decisions to move were pooled together and are shown in Figure 11. The pooled 
psychometric function in Figure 11 indicates that although most of the reported decision-
times are less than 400 msec before the movement, the very earliest times reported for 
decisions are more than a second before the movement. However, further analysis 
revealed that these represent 33 trials from one subject (or 1.6% of all trials), and thus 
they may be misleading. The next earliest percentile was about 400 msec before the 
movement, and there were a total of 169 trials (from 7 subjects) where the reference dot 
represented a time that was more than 400 msec before the key-press, so this point seems 
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Figure 11, showing the distribution of temporal order judgements (fOJs) from 
Experiment 3, pooled across 14 participants. This distribution was calculated as 
described in the text. 
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The mean, median, SD and DL were measured for each distribution, and averaged 
-122, -105, 153 and 99 msec respectively over the 14 participants. Perhaps because of 
the large variability, the mean reported time of the decision to move was only marginally 
earlier than the key-press (p<O. l) while the median_ did not differ significantly from the 
time of the key-press (p>0.2). 
One-factor ANOV As for each of the dependent variables tested the effect of hand. 
Reports about left-hand movements had greater variability than reports about right-hand 
movements (SDs of162 and 145 msec, p<0.05, andDLs of136 and 63 msec, p<0.1, for 


































compared to the right hand (-117 and-92 msec respectively, p<0.1), but the 
difference between the means did not approach significance (-131 and -112 msec, p>0.1 ). 
Discussion 
The main aim of Experiment 3 was to see whether any decisions were reported 
before the start of the RP or LRP. Figure 12 allows a direct comparison between the TOJ 
function and the psychophysiological data (LRP and RP waves). The figure suggests that 
the RP starts before any of the reported decisions (apart from a few reported by the 
anomalous subject described in the Results section), but that the LRP does not. These 
results are consistent with the conclusion that general movement preparation activity may 
be present a long time before a movement, and that hand-specific preparation does not 
start until after the time of the conscious decision to move. 
The results replicate previous findings that the onset of the RP is before the mean 
reported decision-time (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983), and reinforces 
them with the observation that the RP starts before even the earliest reported decisions. It 
seems therefore that we can rule out the possibility that the decision was before the start 
of the RP on each individual trial, and instead conclude that the start of generalised 
movement preparation activity that is measured by the RP really can start before the 
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Figure 12, a comparison of the TOJ distribution from Experiment 3 with the RP 
and LRP activity measured in the same trials. 
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In contrast, the start of hand-specific motor preparation as' measured by the LRP is 
after many of the reported decisions to move. Although the LRP onset ( of -25 0 msec) 
was before the mean W (of-122 msec), Figure 12 suggests thatabout20% of the 
reported decisions are earlier than the LRP onset. This result is consistent with the 
hypothesis the LRP does not start before a conscious decision to move. That is, even 
when the participant knows in advance which hand will be used, it is possible that hand-
specific preparation to move does not start until after the decision to "go now": This 
would support the conclusion that a decision initiates a voluntary movement, in a theory 
similar to Descartes'. The theory would need to be elaborated to allow for some general 
preparatory activity to occur before the movement, although the movement would not 
















In addition, the result that some decisions are before LRP onset 
suggests that in previous studies (where the mean reported decision-time was likewise 
after the onset of averaged brain activity) decisions may also have been reported before 
the onset time of (lateralised) movement preparation, on each individual trial. As 
discussed in previous chapters, the smearing of onset times during EEG averaging may 
mean that the order of events in each trial may not be reflected in the averaged results. 
Another point of interest is that the onset of the RP before a spontaneous 
movement was considerably longer before the movement than those reported previously. 
When the RP onset was determined from visual inspection (as it was by Libet et al., 
1983) the onset time is about-1500 msec, although significance tests showed that the RP 
was not reliably negative until -1100 msec. Even this value is still early, relative to onset 
times of about -500 msec reported previously. RP onsets of about -1500 msec are quite 
typical for voluntary movements, but when the importance of moving spontaneously is 
emphasised onset times as late as -500 msec have been obtained (Keller & Heckhausen, 
1990; Libet et al., 1983). Libet et al. reported that long RP onsets were associated with 
preplanned movements, but the long onset time in the present study occurred even though 
we excluded any movement that the participant reported as having been planned in 
advance. 
The decision-time in the current study is also considerably later than other means 



















means were about 200 msec before the start of EMG activity13• However, the 
current mean is longer before the key-press than the means reported in the previous 
chapters (of-16 (12) msec and -85 (20) msec for Experiments 1 & 2 respectively). The 
variability of W means that it would be hard to argue that any particular average was 
definitive, until further research has clarified how and why W varies across studies. 
One major objection to the conclusion that the LRP does not start before a 
reportable decision to move is the fact that approximately 40% of decisions were reported 
as occurring after the keypress. (In the experiments reported in the previous chapter, the 
percentages of decisions reported as being after the key-press were approximately 50% 
and 20% for Experiments 1 & 2 respectively.) These reports are also a problem for the 
theory that conscious decisions initiate movement, since causes must logically precede 
their effects. The most probable explanation is that participants were simply wrong about 
the time of their decisions, perhaps because instead of the decision to move some made 
reports based on the feeling of moving, or on the somatosensmy feedback about having 
pushed the key, or perhaps because they misremembered or misreported the time of the 
decision. The current study may thus provide further evidence that we do not have 
complete conscious access to our mental processes (Nisbett & Wilson, 1977) . 
In summary, although the onset of the RP may well be before any decisions to 
13 There is probably at least 30-50 msec between the onset of EMG activity and 



























move, hand-specific preparation to move (the LRP) may not start until after the 
decision to "go now". 
Experiment 4 
In Experiment 3 we found that the earliest reported time of a decision to move 
was before the onset of the LRP. Thus, it appears that hand-specific preparation to move 
may not begin until after a conscious decision to initiate the movement. In the fourth 
study we looked at whether such preparation can begin before the reported time of a 
decision about which hand to move. That is, we allowed participants to choose which 
hand to move, and compared the earliest time physiological evidence that the decision of 
which hand to move had been made with the earliest time that participants thought the 
decision had been made. Because of how it is derived, the LRP cannot start until after 
the hand that will move has been specified, so it was interesting to compare the LRP 
onset with the time that this specification was reported as having happened. For the 
results of the decision about which hand to move to parallel those of the decision when to 
move, Li bet would presumably predict that there should be EEG evidence of hand-
specific activation (that is, the LRP) before the reported time of a conscious decision of 
which hand to move. 
The reported time of the decision to move was also recorded for comparison with 
the previous study, to see if the brain waves (LRP and RP) differed depending on whether 
the choice of which hand to move was cued (as in the previous study) or determined by 

















( either "when to move" or "which hand to move") before the start of the either 
the LRP or the RP. We were also interested in which decision (when or hand) was 




19 participants were recruited from the same pool as in the first experiment, and 
these were also paid $30 for a single 3-hour session. The participants were right-handed 
and had normal or corrected to normal vision. 
Apparatus and Procedure 
The apparatus, clock presentation, and procedure for reporting the time of a 
decision were the same as in Experiment 3, as were the apparatus and the collection of 
EEG data. The main difference between the experiments was that in Experiment 3 
participants were told which hand to move on each trial, while in Experiment 4 the choice 
of which hand was left to the participant. As well as the decision of when to "go 
now"(the "When-report" condition), they also made reports about the time of the decision 
of which hand to move ("Hand-report" condition). These conditions were tested in 
separate blocks. It should be noted that the "When-report" condition was t_he same as the 
task in the previous experiment. 
'When-report condition. The When-report condition was very similar to the task 



















right forefingers on the [z] key and the[/] (slash) key respectively), and made a 
sudden hand movement with one hand at any time they chose during each trial. After 
each movement, the participant was asked to report the time of the decision to "move 
now" (using the same reporting procedure as in the previous experiment), and to indicate 
whether the decision to move had been spontaneous [z key] or preplanned [slash key]. 
In contrast to the previous experiment there was no Lor Rat the start of the 
When-report condition trial. Participants were allowed to choose which hand to move in 
each trial, but were requested to keep the number ofle:ft- and right-handed movements 
approximately equal. They were also asked not to plan in advance when to move or 
which hand to move with, but to let the movement happen spontaneously. 
Hand-report condition. The procedure for the Hand-report condition was exactly 
the same as the When-report condition, except after the movement the participant was 
prompted to make a report about the time of their decision of which hand to move with. 
After making the report, they were also asked whether their decision of which hand to 
move had been spontaneous [z key] or preplanned [slash key]. 
Design. All participants completed 6 consecutive blocks of each condition, with 
20 trials in each block. The condition order was counterbalanced across participants. 
After 6 blocks there was a break of 5 minutes and then verbal instructions from the 
experimenter about the new condition. After a block the instructions for the appropriate 
condition appeared on-screen and remained until the participant initiated the next block. 
Each block began with a question presented on the screen, asking the participant which 



















Participants answered by tapping either the [z] key or the[/] key, and the trials 
did not proceed until the question had been answered correctly. 
Results 
Preliminary EEG analysis 
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The same trials were used for both EEG and TOJ analysis. For all 19 participants, 
trials with no movements (1.6%) or movements within the first 1000 msec (16.4%, range 
. 0-72.5%) were excluded. We also excluded all trials where the movement was described 
as preplanned rather than spontaneous: the mean percentage of preplanned trials was 
18.2%, with a range 0-66% (there were not enough preplanned trials to analyse them 
separately). We then removed trials containing EEG artifacts, such as horizontal eye 
movements, transient tension in the arm muscles and amplifier problems in the 2000 
msec before the movement. The mean percentage of trials removed because of artifacts 
was 11.3%. To ensure that there were enough trials to get reasonable average RPs and 
LRPs, we then excluded the 5 participants who did not have at least 20 trials remaining 
for each hand for both conditions. The 14 remaining participants had an average of 156 
trials each remaining (65% of the total possible trials, range 38.8% to 81.7%). 
As in the previous experiment, we used an eye-movement correction procedure 
(EMCP; Gratton, Coles, & Donchin, 1983) to remove the effects of blinks and horizontal 
eye movement from scalp EEGs. The recording from each channel was then time-locked 
to the key-press, averaged across trials, and baselined. The 200-msec period before the 

















performed on the mean amplitudes of the unfiltered waveforms, which are also 
shown in the figures. 
Electrophysiological results 
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The RP. As in the previous experiment, activity from Cz was averaged over left-
and right-hand movements to look at the RP. 
Figure 13 shows Cz averaged across all 14 subjects, separately for the When and 
Hand-report conditions. The negative slope seems to be present even from the start of the 
recording epoch, but becomes more steeply negative about one second before the 
movement. 
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Figure 13, showing Cz activity from Experiment 4 (n=14, with an average of 156 

























The mean amplitudes of the unfiltered Czs were measured in 100-msec 
epochs from 2000 msec before to 100 msec after the movement. For each epoch, 2x2 
ANOV As were carried out to test the effect of Condition (When or Hand) and Condition 
Order (Move-first or Hand-first) on the amount of Cz activity. Overall, the negative 
activity during the earliest epoch was marginally significant (p<0.1 ), while the epochs 
which started from -1900 msec to -100 msec were all significantly negative (p<0.05). 
The RP is therefore present at least 2000 msec before the movement, and possibly longer. 
Numerically, the Hand-report condition produced greater negativity than the 
When-report condition, but this difference did not approach significance for any epoch 
(ps>0.1 ). There was also no main effect of Condition Order for any epoch, but there was 
an interaction between Condition and Condition Order for several epochs, which meant 
that the condition performed in the first half of the experiment created more negativity at 
Cz than the condition in the second half This interaction was at least marginally 
significant (p<0.1) for all the epochs between -700 and+ 100 msec, with the epochs 
starting at-600, -300, -200, -100 and+ 100 msec being significant at the p<0.05 level. 
This effect is consistent with previous findings that the amplitude of the RP decreases as 
the participants lose interest in the task (Deecke et al, 1973). 
To test whether the RP onset latency was different between the two conditions, 
jackknifing analyses were performed as described earlier (Miller et al., 1998) . 
Recordings of Cz for both conditions were averaged over each subgroup of 13 out of the 
14 participants, smoothed using a finite-impulse response filter (Cook & Miller, 1992), 
and the latency for each average to reach 50% of the minimum amplitude was scored. 




























conditions were compared. This procedure was repeated using onset criteria of 
40, 60, and 70% of minimum amplitude. None of the comparisons were significant, so 
there was no evidence that the RP onset depended on which of the decisions was to be 
reported . 
To summarise, the RP was significantly negative 2000 msec before the 
movement. There was no effect on amplitude or latency due to which decision (When or 
Hand) was reported but the amplitude for the RP decreased across the experiment, 
possibly as participants' attention waned (Deecke et al., 1973). 
The LRP. The LRP was created from recordings of the activity at C3' and C4' as 
described previously, separately for each condition. The unfiltered waves for the When 
and Hand-report conditions were averaged over 14 participants and are shown in Figure 
14. The :figure suggests that the onset of the LRP is between 300-600 msec before the 
movement, and that the LRP may be larger and earlier before the Hand-report condition 
than before the When-report condition. 
The mean amplitude of the LRP was measured in 50 msec epochs from 1000 
msec before the movement, and as above 2x2 ANOV As tested for the effects of 
Condition and Condition Order. The LRP was numerically larger for the Hand-report 
condition than the When-report condition, and this difference achieved marginal 
significance during the epochs starting at -600, -500, -400, -250, -200 and -100 msec. 
There was no effect of Condition Order, and there was also no Condition by Condition 
Order interaction, apart from a marginal tendency (in the epoch starting at -1000 msec, 
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Figure 14, showing the LRP from Experiment 4 (n=14), separately for the When 
and Hand-report conditions. 
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The jackknifing procedure that was used to confirm the difference between onset 
latencies for the two report conditions was similar to that used for the RPs. Fourteen 
average LRPs for each condition were calculated ( each leaving out a different 
participant), smoothed using a finite-impulse response filter (Cook & Miller, 1992), and 
the latency of the onset was scored; once again the criteria for onset of 40, 50, 60 and 
70% of maximum amplitude (Miller et al., 1998). The results confirmed that the LRP 
was earlier for the Hand-report condition than for the When-report condition. The 
difference was 54 msec for the 70% criterion (-15 5 versus -209 msec, p<O. l ). Note that 



























difference between the two conditions should remain fairly constant across 
criteria. 
Because of the significant differences between conditions, we looked at the LRP 
for each condition separately. For the When-report condition, the LRP was positive from 
-200 to+ 100 msec. Much earlier, there was some negative LRP (where the hand that 
ends up not moving is more prepared than the one that will move), which was marginal at 
-950 and -800 msec, and significant at -750, -700, and -600 msec. For the Hand-report 
condition, the LRP was significantly positive from -400 to + 100 (p<O. 05), apart from the 
epoch at-350 msec that was only marginally positive (p<O.l). 
Overall then, significance tests confirmed that the LRP (which measures hand-
specific movement preparation) begins earlier for the Hand-report condition than for the 
When-report condition and has marginally greater amplitude (see Figure 14). The 
negative LRP at -700 msec is interesting, and it suggests that, especially for the When-
report condition, participants may have prepared to move first one had and then the other 
before finally moving, perhaps in an effort to make the time of the movement more 
spontaneous. 
TOJresults 
The probability distributions were calculated as described previously, separately 
by Condition and Hand, and the mean, median, standard deviation (SD) and difference 
threshold (DL) were measured for each di,stribution. There were 4 distributions for each 
participant, and no participant had 3 or more SDs that were more than 2 SDs above the 
97 
mean for the group. The dependent variables were analysed with 2x2x2 
ANOV As, to test for the effects of Condition (When or Hand), Condition Order (Move-
first or Hand-first) and Hand (left or right). Figure 15 shows the pooled average over 14 
participants for both conditions. 
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Figure 15, showing the pooled distributions of temporal order judgements 
(TOJs) from Experiment 4, separately for the When and Hand-report conditions 
(n=14).The average values of the mean, median, SD and DL were -83, -32, 145 and 
122 msec for the When-report condition, and -80, -45, 151, 128 msec for the Hand-
report condition, !'espectively. There were no significant or even marginal main 
effects or interactions for any of the dependent variables. Figure 15 also shows that 
the earliest decision of when to move is at about -500 msec, while the earliest 
























The main qu.estion of Experiment 4 was whether there was any evidence of hand-
specific movement preparation (that is, the LRP) before the earliest reported times of the 
conscious decision of which hand to move. The times of the LRP, RP, and TOJ 
psychometric function for the When-report condition are shown in Figure 16. Analogous 
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Figure 16, a comparison of the TOJ distribution from the When-report condition of 
Experiment 4, with the RP and LRP activity measured in the same trials (n=14). 
In the Hand-report condition, the RP always started before the reported times of 
the decisions of which hand to use, so there was no evidence that decision was before the 
RP on any trial. On the other hand, about 20% of the decisions were reported before the 
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start of the LRP, and this is consistent with the possibility that the decision 
about which hand to move was always before the start of the LRP on each trial. That is, 
hand-specific movernent preparation may not have started until after the reported time of 
the decision of which hand to move. 
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Figure 17, a comparison of the TOJ distribution from the Hand-report condition of 
Experiment 4, with the RP and LRP activity measured in the same trials (n=14) . 
The results of the When-report condition largely replicated those of Experiment 3 
in that all the decisions of when to move were after_the onsetofthe RP, while . 
approximately 30% of them were before the LRP onset time. Both the earliest reported 
decisions and the LRP onset were longer before the movement for reports about which 
Hand to move, relative to reports about When to move. This difference between the 






















to initiate the movement as well as which hand to move) before every 
movement, and the only difference between the two conditions was the decision that was 
to be reported. However despite the difference between the times of the earliest 
decisions, the mean reported times of the two decisions were virtually identical (-83 and 
-80 msec for the When and Hand reports respectively). This might mean that the 
decision of which hand will be moved is an intrinsic part of the decision to "move now", 
or it may be although the decisions are separate, participants were unable to distinguish 
them. 
Comparison between Experiments 3 and 4 
We were interested in whether preparatory activity before a voluntary movement 
(as measured by the LRP and the RP) was affected by whether the participant was told 
which hand to move (as in Experiment 3) or was allowed to choose the moving hand at 
the last minute (as in Experiment 4). 
To look at differences in the onset latencies between the third experiment and the 
when-report condition in the fourth experiment, the jackknifing procedure described 
previously was used for both the RP and the LRP. As previously, we used various 
criteria for onset latency, from 40-70% of minimum amplitude (for the RP; percentage of 
maximum amplitude was used for the positive-going LRP). None of the comparisons was 
significant for either the RP or LRP, so there is no evidence that the onset latency of 
movement preparation is affect by whether the moving hand is specified by the 



























Neither did the difference between the two experiments affect the 
mean time that participants reported for the time of their decision to move. The mean 
time of a decision to move in the first experiment (-122 msec, with a standard error of 41 
msec) was not significantly different to either the mean When-time (-83 (39) msec) or 
mean Hand-time of the second experiment (-80 (40) msec), with ts of0.69 and 0.73 
respectively. 
The comparison between the brain activity recorded in the third experiment and in 
the When-report condition of the fourth experiment allowed us to look at the effect of 
being able to choose which hand to move with. The jackknifing analysis showed that 
there were no latency differences in the LRP or RP as a function of whether the 
participant was cued or was able to choose which hand to move. As in the third 
experiment, the mean reported time of deciding to move was closer to the time of the 
movement than the values of about -200 msec reported in previous studies (Keller & 
Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983). The sequence of experiments reported here has 
yielded mean reported decision-times of-16, -85, -122 and-83 msec for Experiments 1-4, 
respectively. The reason for such variability is unclear, but as mentioned in the previous 
chapter it must make us cautious about claiming that any one mean is definitive. 
Another point that was common to both experiments was that reports about 
decisions after the time of the movement (approximately 30% of decisions across tasks) 
pose a problem for the conclusion that the decision occurs before the LRP on each 
individual trial. They also suggest that the reported decision may not have been the event 
that initiated the movements. It may be that further study is necessary to determine how 































In summary, although the long RP shows that some general 
anticipation may be present more than 2 seconds before a movement, the hand-specific 
LRP necessary for immediate movement initiation may not begin until after both the 
decision to move and the decision of which hand to move. 
Conclusions over Experiments 3 and 4 
The purpose of these two studies was to look at the relationships between the 
reported times of the decision to initiate a movement, or the decision of which hand to 
move, and two distinct forms of cortical movement preparation, the RP and the LRP. 
The RP, which is symmetrical across hemispheres and seems to be associated with the 
anticipation of a future movement, was found to precede even the earliest reported 
decisions. This replicates and extends previous studies that found the RP to start before 
the mean of the reported decision-times (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983). 
In contrast, a reasonable proportion of decisions (approximately 20%) was reported 
before the onset of the LRP, which reflects hand-specific preparation for an immediate 
movement. Since there are some decisions before LRP onset, it is possible that the 
decision is always before the start of the LRP on each individual trial. 
Li bet et al. (1983) argued that since the onset of the RP was before the mean time 
of the conscious decision to move, movement initiation must begin unconsciously and 
therefore must not be under conscious control. In contrast, the simplest interpretation of 
the current results would suggest that in fact the hand-specific preparation necessary for 
























move. We would argue that even though the conscious decisions are always 
reported after the onset of the RP, the slow symmetrical wave is an indicator of a 
movement that is being contemplated for the future ( or some other type of anticipation), 
rather than one that is in the process of being initiated immediately. 
The conclusion that the final preparations to move may not be made until after a 
decision to move would contradict Li bet et al.' s findings and reinforce the common belief 
that our conscious decisions are effective in initiating our actions. However, it is 
necessary to speculate on the nature of the events that subjects made reports about. Since 
we asked people to report when they decided to move, their answers have at least face 
validity as the times that the decisions occurred, and although it has been argued that the 
decision to initiate a movement is not usually a conscious one (Keller & Heckhausen, 
1990; various commentators to Libet, 1985) participants are evidently willing and able to 
make reports about the time of such decisions. On the other hand, Nisbett and Wilson 
(1977) list several situations in which people are reliably, demonstrably wrong about 
their cognitive processes, but still make confident reports about such processes. 
Experiments in chapter 2 showed that the distribution of reports about the time of 
a decision is similar to the distribution of reports about the time of a tone, which suggests 
that rather than making up a time, participants in these studies really did report the time 
of some event as accurately as possible. However since a large proportion of all reported 
decision-times were after the time of the movement, it seems unlikely that they were able 
to report the time of the event that initiated the movement, since causes must logically 
precede their effects. One possibility is that subjects made reports about some other 























1990) the transfer of control of the movement from an unconscious to a 
conscious control system in the brain. An alternative possibility is that the times reported 
were wrong, perhaps delayed by some constant or random variable, although it would be 
hard to know how to understand a claim that the time someone became aware of a 
conscious decision to move was not the time that the conscious decision actually 
occurred. 
Perhaps the only thing we can be sure of is that the psychophysiology of intention 
(Breitmeyer, 1985; Marks, 1985) is not yet an exact science, and in particular it is not 



























Summary and General Discussion 
Are we free to do what we choose to do? It certainly seems that the ability to 
determine our own actions is an important part of being human, but how exactly do we 
do it? A widespread assumption, in the tradition of Descartes (trans. 1988) is that the 
decision to perform an action is a mental event, which affects the brain and causes it to 
stimulate nerves so that the relevant muscles contract to perform the movement. 
However, it has been suggested that the feeling that we are able to choose what to do may 
be an illusion. 
The assumption that conscious decisions have causal power over our actions has 
been challenged by a report that the brain seems to start preparing to move before the 
person concerned is aware of having decided to initiate the movement. As described 
above, this claim was made by Libet et al. (1983), who performed a study in which 
people reported the time that they decided to make a sudden movement. The results of 
the study indicated that the reported decision-times were after the brain had started to 
prepare the movement. Libet et al. concluded that voluntary movements are initiated 
unconsciously (since there was electrophysiological evidence of the initiation before the 
conscious decision to move), and thus that our conscious decisions do not cause our 
actions. It was suggested that our decisions might still be capable of vetoing actions that 
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everyday experience of being able to make decisions and implement them. In 
addition, as Gomes (1988) noted, the results and conclusions of Li bet et al. (1983) have 
been extensively cited, but apart from Keller & Heckhausen (1990) there have been no 
reported replications of the study . 
The main aims of this thesis were to try to replicate the experimental evidence for 
Li bet et al. 's (1983) conclusion that voluntary movements are initiated unconsciously, and 
to test two alternative explanations for their results. In Chapters 2 and 3, we examined an 
alternative explanation for Libet et al.' s (1983) results based on a smearing artifact that 
occurs during the averaging of EEG data across trials. The artifact ensures that the onset 
latency of an EEG component, measured after trials have been averaged together, reflects 
the earliest onset of that component occurring in any of the trials that made up the 
average. As a consequence of the smearing artifact, Li bet et al. 's finding that the mean 
time of the decision to move was after the start of cortical movement preparation could 
still have occurred even if the decision was before the onset of preparation on each 
individual trial during their study. In other words, the order of the decision and the onset 
of cortical movement preparation within each trial may not have been accurately reflected 
in the overall averages. 
We tested this alternative explanation by asking participants to report the times of 
their decisions to move, using methods similar to Li bet et al. 's original paradigm. We 
employed temporal order judgement methodology to calculate the distribution of reported 
decision-times, and in particular to see whether the earliest reported decision times were 
before the onset of movement preparation. Evidence that the earliest reported decisions 






























actions are always initiated by our decisions, and inconsistent with Libet et 
al. 's suggestion that voluntary movements are initiated unconsciously. On the other 
hand, evidence that the earliest reported decisions were after the onset of movement 
preparation would support Libet et al. 's original conclusion that the preparation to move 
begins before a conscious decision to initiate the movement 
Previous studies (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Li bet et al., 1983) had reported that 
one measurement of cortical movement preparation, the Readiness Potential (or RP, first 
described by Komhuber & Deecke, 1964; Deecke et al., 1976), started 500 msec before a 
spontaneous hand movement. For this reason we looked for evidence that there were any 
decision reported as being more than 500 msec before the movement in Experiments 1 
and 2. If some decisions were reported more than 500 msec before the movement, it 
would be possible that the decision was always before the start of the RP, while evidence 
that all of the decisions were less than 500 msec before the movement would rule out this 
possibility. 
The psychometric functions obtained in Experiment 2 (but not Experiment 1) 
suggested that at least a few decisions to move were reported more than 500 msec before 
the movement. That is, it is possible that some decisions were before the time that 
previous studies have reported the onset of the RP (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et 
al., 1983). An obvious limitation to this conclusion is that the reported decisions and RPs 
were being compared across different subjects and experimental conditions. For this 
reason, in Experiments 3 and 4 of Chapter 3, we recorded both the reported times of a 
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In addition, Experiments 3 and 4 were designed to test the second 
alternative explanation for Libet's results. This explanation was based on the possibility 
that the EEG measured by Libet et al. before the reported decisions to move did not in 
fact reflect processes involved in movement initiation. It was argued that while the RP 
seems to reflect brain processes involved in the anticipation and planning of a movement 
sometime in the future (Shibosaki, 1992), the LRP is understood to indicate hand-specific 
movement preparation necessary for i11itiating an immediate movement (see Miller & 
Hackley, 1992, for a review). In particular, we argued that LRP was more specific to 
movement initiation than the Readiness Potential (RP), and in Experiments 3 and 4 we 
looked at the relationship that each of these measures had with the reported times of 
decisions to move. The results of these experiments indicated that although all of the 
reported times of the decisions to move were after the start of the RP, a reasonable 
proportion of the decisions (about 20%) were before the start of the LRP, and it is 
possible that in each trial the LRP does not start until after the time of a reportable 
decision to move. We concluded that although there may be some general anticipation of 
a movement (reflected by the RP) before a conscious decision to move, the specific 
processes required to initiate the movement immediately (as indicated by the presence of 
the LRP) may not start until after such a decision. Our results are therefore consistent 
with the theory that a conscious decision is required before the initiation of a voluntary 
movement, which is more similar to the position of Descartes (trans. 1988) than that of 
Libet et al. (1983 ) . 
In addition, the results of Experiments 3 and 4 indicated that the smearing artifact 


















Specifically, we found that all reported decisions were after the onset of the 
RP, confirming and strengthening previous findings that the mean W was after the onset 
of the RP (Keller & Heckhausen, 1990; Libet et al., 1983 )14. 
Our results are also consistent with the theory that the RP (which Libet et al., 
1983 interpreted purely as movement preparation) may instead at least partly reflect the 
cortical processes necessary for a conscious decision to move (Danto, 1985; MacKay, 
1985; Merikle & Cheesman, 1985; Underwood &Niemi, 1985; Wood, 1985). According 
to the theory that cortical activity is the physical substrate that underlies mental 
processes, the finding that the RP occurs before a conscious decision (replicated in the 
current studies) is compatible with conscious movement initiation. As Merikle and 
Cheesman (1985, p548) expressed it, 
"As long as it is assumed that conscious awareness is based on underlying brain 
processes, an assumption consistent with the views of most cognitive psychologists, then 
it is not surprising that certain brain processes occur prior to self-reports of conscious 
awareness. In fact, how could it be otherwise?" 
In conclusion, it should be noted that while Libet et al. 's (1983) study represents a 
14 The RP recorded in th.ese experiments started longer before the movement than 
the 500 msec reported previously by Keller & Heckhausen, 1990, and Li bet et al., 1983. 
The decisions reported in Experiments 1 and 2 would also have been after the start of the 
























bold attempt to clarify the relationship between conscious decisions and brain 
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